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Chapters 1 and 2 of this dissertation explore the evergrowing outpatient surgical mar-
ket and how hospitals respond to specialized competitors, Ambulatory Surgical Centers
(ASCs). ASCs are providers of surgical procedures that occur in an outpatient medical
setting. Relative to hospitals, ASCs exhibit a lower cost structure, have lower prices to
insurers and patients, and provide a higher quality of care. ASCs have grown in popularity
among patients since the late 1980s and among insurers in more recent years. Hospital
proponents have expressed concern that ASCs may have negative effects on the availability
of hospital services, since ASCs may cherry-pick the most profitable patients who might
otherwise have obtained care in hospitals, leaving hospitals with a pool of more costly or
less well-insured patients, which could threaten the economic viability of hospitals. Lim-
ited research has indicated that hospitals do exhibit a loss of outpatient surgical volume
over time in the presence of ASCs. Other studies have noted that ASCs do indeed service
more profitable and healthy patients, with indications that these differentials may stem from
physician-ownership of ASCs.
While standard theory would dictate that hospitals would exit the market in the face
of superior competitors, hospitals have continued to operate in the outpatient market, and
in some cases have exhibited expanding outpatient revenue over time. There are a few
factors that likely contribute to hospitals’ continued ability to compete with ASCs, and
examples include successful lobbying efforts to establish legislative restrictions on ASCs
and receiving higher revenue from insurers (reimbursement rates) relative to ASCs. These
interventions, however, may not last, as exemplified by recent legislation that proposes
to enforce site neutral payments, which would pay hospitals at substantially lower rates.
Hospital responses to ASCs that are in line with more typical quantity- or price-based
competitive strategies have not been examined. The exact mechanisms for competition
under these avenues depend on a hospital’s maximizing objectives. For-profit hospitals are
assumed to be profit-maximizers. Not-for-profit hospitals, however, have no shortage of
theoretical models, with mixed empirical evidence to support them.
This dissertation expands on studies concerning hospital-ASC competition by separat-
ing the aggregate outpatient market into surgical procedure classifications, within estab-
lished market geographies for patients. Specifically, I examine three specialty outpatient
markets in which ASCs have exhibited substantial growth nationally and in the state of
Florida, from 2000 through 2009, in addition to examining a combined market of all other
outpatient surgical procedures. In this outpatient market dissection, I empirically examine
how hospital patient volume, the number of physicians, and patient insurer mix vary by
ASC presence in a given market. I extend a model of not-for-profit hospitals as revenue
maximizers that accounts for physicians as the main driver of service volume and motivates
potential not-for-profit service expansion in response to competition.
Using Florida state data, my estimates suggest differential hospital ownership status
effects on hospital patient volume, hospital physicians, and highest revenue patients (those
privately insured) in select markets. Specifically, estimates indicate that for-profit hospi-
tals have lost a sizable amount of their privately/commercially insured patients in markets
where they face ASC competition, while not-for-profit hospitals did not. My estimates
further indicate that not-for-profit hospitals are more likely to exhibit output expansion,
primarily among privately insured patients. Taken together, my results further the literature
on differential objectives of hospital ownership by examining emerging hospital markets
and indicating that in Florida, where the split between for-profit and not-for-profit private
hospitals is even, ASCs will focus on for-profit hospital populations first, and not-for-profit
hospitals can maximize output in a manner that prioritizes revenue.
Chapter 3 of this dissertation focuses on the direct and indirect costs to society of a
popular surgical treatment for end-stage knee osteoarthritis - the total knee arthroplasty
(TKA). This chapter motivated my historical examination in Chapter 2, as this popular and
expensive procedure has potential to transition to an outpatient setting, given advances in
anesthesia and its low complication rate. Indeed, while TKA has been isolated to hospi-
tal settings to date, recent legislation from Medicare in 2018 notes a potential for a shift
of this high revenue procedure from a hospital setting to an ASC setting, which would
likely decrease the direct medical costs noted below and increase the societal value of this
procedure.
This chapter, published in 2013, notes the importance of societal perspective in valuing
surgical procedures, and in doing so, considers hospital medical costs of providing a pro-
cedure that is growing in popularity. Using a Markov model, my coauthors and I estimated
the value of TKA by comparing direct and indirect costs between surgical and nonsurgical
treatment scenarios. Direct costs considered all surgical and non-surgical medical costs for
osteoarthritis of the knee, including hospital costs (insurer reimbursements). Indirect costs
included lost wages due to an inability to work, lower earnings, or receipt of disability pay-
ments. Our model further incorporated quality-of-life measures to estimate costs over pa-
tients’ lifetimes and quality-adjusted life years. Assumptions and cost estimates came from
Medicare claims data (with all-payer adjustments), survey data, clinical expert opinion, and
peer-reviewed literature. Compared with nonsurgical treatment, we found that total knee
arthroplasty increased lifetime direct costs by a mean of $20,635 (net present value in 2009
U.S. dollars). These costs were offset by societal savings of $39,565 from reduced indirect
costs, resulting in a lifetime societal net benefit from total knee arthroplasty of $18,930 per
patient. Eighty-five percent of these savings originated from increased employment and
earnings, with the remaining 15% from fewer missed workdays and lower disability pay-
ments. A large portion of direct medical costs were driven by the hospital-based setting of
the surgical procedure. The estimated lifetime societal savings from the more than 600,000
total knee arthroplasties performed in the U.S. in 2009 were estimated to be approximately
$12 billion. These societal savings primarily accrued to patients and employers.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Medical care providers have adopted emerging medical technology and advancing med-
ical practice in a way that has reshaped how and where patients receive health care. A prime
example is the shift of diagnostic, imaging, and surgical services from a traditional hospital
inpatient setting to an outpatient setting that does not require an overnight stay. This shift
is attributable in part to technological advancements in anesthesia and imaging technology,
advancements in minimally invasive surgical techniques, and changes in provider financial
incentives (Lumsdon et al., 1992; Duffy and Farley, 1995). Data from the 1980s to more
recent years provide perspective on the magnitude of this shift from inpatient to outpatient
settings. Specifically, less than 5 percent of the 20 million surgical procedures performed
in 1981 were performed in outpatient settings, while approximately 80 percent of the 50
million surgeries performed in 2005 were performed in outpatient settings (AHA, 2006).1
Outpatient settings include traditional general/acute care hospital outpatient depart-
ments (HOPDs), physician offices, and ambulatory surgical centers (ASCs). HOPDs are
typically full-service entities, providing a cadre of surgical services and non-surgical imag-
ing and diagnostic services, while physician offices principally provide diagnostic and
1One would not expect a one-to-one transition of procedures from inpatient to outpatient settings, even
after accounting for population growth, because the advancements in minimally invasive surgery and anes-
thesia would expand the surgical market to patients whose risk profile would have not permitted general
anesthesia and more invasive surgical techniques.
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imaging services. Less than 10 percent of all outpatient surgeries were performed in ASCs
or physician offices in 1981, but by 2005, these settings accounted for over 50 percent
of outpatient surgeries (AHA, 2006). From the 1980s through the mid-2000s, physician
offices exhibited a greater rate of growth in imaging and diagnostic outpatient services rel-
ative to HOPDs. MedPAC (2013) notes a reversal in this trend that began in the late 2000s,
a shifting of outpatient services (principally diagnostic) back to HOPDs. This trend reversal
was consistent with Medicare payment changes over those years that provided higher reim-
bursement for a given service provided at a HOPD relative to a physician office (MedPAC,
2013).
While HOPDs may compete with physician offices for outpatient diagnostic services,
ASCs have burgeoned as the principal competition to HOPDs in select outpatient surgical
markets over the past three decades. From capturing approximately 5 percent of the out-
patient surgical market in 1981, ASC market share increased to approximately 45 percent
of outpatient surgeries in 2005 (AHA, 2006). This increasing share of outpatient surgeries
corresponds with ASC firm expansion. In the early 1980s, there were fewer than 300 ASCs
in the United States; there were 1,460 ASCs in 1991; 3,028 in 2000; and 5,111 in 2010.
(Durant, 1988; MedPAC, 2013; MedPAC, 2017). The majority of ASCs are single-specialty
facilities, have few operating rooms, and tend to specialize in the most profitable of out-
patient surgeries – opthalmologic, gastroenterology, and orthopedic outpatient surgeries –
but may also provide other specialties, such as plastic surgery (MedPAC, 2013; Cram et al.,
2012). ASCs are solely or partially owned by physicians and are predominantly for-profit
institutions (95+ percent) located in urban areas (MedPAC, 2016b).
The remainder of this chapter reviews existing literature that relates to hospital-ASC
2
competition and how this competition may differ by hospital ownership characteristics. In
doing so, this review establishes considerations for my empirical work in Chapter 2, which
aims to assess the relationship between ASC presence and hospital outpatient surgical pro-
vision by ownership type.
1.1 The Fight Against ASCs
Hospitals have responded to competition from other hospitals in a variety of ways on
price and non-price dimensions that have been extensively documented,2 including strate-
gic investments, mergers, changes in quantity or quality, and reputation. ASCs, however,
maintain a particular competitive advantage to hospitals. Namely, ASCs are able to provide
outpatient surgical services more efficiently, at higher average quality, and at lower cost rel-
ative to HOPDs (Casalino et al., 2003; Munnich and Parente, 2014a). These efficiencies
are not unexpected given a production model described as a ”focused factory” (Casalino
et al., 2003; Carey and Mitchell, 2017b), even among multi-specialty ASCs (Carey and
Mitchell, 2017a). Given ASCs’ exhibited benefits to patients, medical providers, and in-
surers, regulators have called for increased utilization of ASCs since the late 1990s (OIG,
1999).3
The appeal of ASCs for patients is clear. ASCs have shorter wait times and easier
scheduling relative to hospital outpatient departments (Cullen et al., 2009a; Munnich and
Parente, 2014a). Studies have also reported that specialized surgical facilities, such as
ASCs, can achieve better quality, efficiency, and patient satisfaction than full-service hos-
2Gaynor and Town (2011); Zwanziger and M (2005); Abraham et al. (2007); Devers et al. (2003) provide
comprehensive reviews of hospital-to-hospital competition on price and non-price dimensions.
3The 1999 report and regulation was to allow ASCs safe harbor under federal anti-kickback legislation.
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pitals (Grisel and Arjmand, 2009; Munnich and Parente, 2014b). Further, ASCs provide
these surgical services at a lower cost and thus have the potential to offer significant savings
to insurers. Under Medicare, for example, ASC payment rates are lower than HOPDs, and
in 2011, were approximately 60% of rates paid to hospitals for outpatient surgical services
(MedPAC, 2013).
The growth of ASCs is likely to have wide-reaching influences on patient welfare
and policy-making decisions. Proponents of ASCs commonly cite the aforementioned in-
creased patient welfare engendered from shorter wait times, increased choice of where to
have their procedure done, and overall convenience to the patient. Further, they claim that
the competition promoted by the emergence of such entities into the market may foster
incentives for further technological innovations that may increase the efficiency of current
procedures performed in ASCs (and HOPDs) and decrease costs in the health care indus-
try. Regulators agree. OIG (1999) and OIG (2014) advised policy changes to bolster the
utilization of ASCs, including equating HOPD payments for surgical services performed at
ASCs to ASC rates.
Other research is not so optimistic. These works suggest that growth and physician
ownership of ASCs may result in more, and potentially unnecessary, surgical volume than
that already inherent in fee-for-service health care payment systems. Physicians who treat
patients on site typically have vested financial interests in the facility as part or whole own-
ers of ASCs (Casalino et al., 2003; MedPAC, 2016b). There is some evidence that physi-
cians ”cherry pick” highly profitable surgical cases (e.g., cataract surgeries) for their ASC
and leave low/no-profit and high-risk cases for neighboring hospitals (Plotzke and Courte-
manche, 2011; Gabel et al., 2008; Schneider et al., 2008). Winter (2003) similarly found
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that the average risk (based on comorbidities and age) of patients is significantly lower for
those treated at ASCs than those treated in hospital outpatient departments.4 Expanding on
physician ownership incentives, the literature has also found that ASCs potentially induce
demand for outpatient surgical procedures via physician-ASC ownership. For example,
Hollingsworth et al. (2010) found a greater increase in annual case-loads of presumed ASC
physician owners from the pre- to post-ownership period compared with non-owners for
five common types of procedures performed in ASCs. Hollingsworth et al. (2009) reported
a higher level and growth of annual case-loads of urological surgery for physician owners
than non-owners. Similarly, Mitchell (2010) used data from a single private insurer and
42 ASCs and specialty hospitals in Idaho to compare the frequency of three procedures
between physician owners and non-owners of ASCs and observed a substantially higher
frequency of procedure use among patients treated by physician owners than those treated
by non-owners.
Increased ASC utilization and potential patient cherry-picking by physicians affiliated
with ASCs have arguably left full-service hospitals and their outpatient departments in a
less profitable position that may hinder their ability to sustain uncompensated care services
(Casalino et al., 2003). Policy-maker reaction to the rapid growth and utilization of ASCs
has been mixed, as perceived benefits may be offset by misaligned incentives. What’s a
hospital to do?
Previous studies have examined hospitals’ competitive responses to specialty provider
types. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, for example, hospitals competed for patients
4Wynn et al. (2008) and MedPAC (2016a) had similar findings, which varied by patient risk definition
and time frame.
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against specialty hospitals5 (inpatient services) and ASCs (outpatient services). These re-
sponses included establishing their own specializations (e.g., service lines/teams) and ex-
pansion of outpatient services (Berenson et al., 2006) and were not surprising, given hos-
pitals’ dependence on high-revenue/profit surgical procedures to subsidize less profitable
service offerings, including care for uninsured patients (Casalino et al., 2003; MedPAC,
2006). It is important to note, however, that unlike specialty hospitals, ASCs require less
capital and are less complex facilities (FTC and DOJ, 2004). Anecdotal evidence also
points to strategic pricing increases or changes in output service offerings in the face of
specialty providers – including the shuttering of service types (MedPAC, 2006).
Few studies, however, have examined any direct effect of ASCs on HOPD output. In
a national sample, Courtemanche and Plotzke (2010) estimated that ASCs located within
15 miles of an HOPD result in an overall reduction in that HOPD’s outpatient surgical
volume. Bian and Morrisey (2007) discuss similar findings in larger geographic regions;
namely, Metropolitan Statistical Areas. These two studies face a similar critical limitation.
Namely, they study HOPDs and ASCs in outpatient surgical markets defined in a singular
dimension of geography. In doing so, these authors treat ASCs as homogeneous firms,
ignoring ASC specialization. Other studies focused on narrow specific outpatient surgical
markets without providing a complete picture of the competition that HOPDs face. Suskind
et al. (2014), for example, examined urological surgeries from 2001 to 2010 and found that
hospital urological surgeries decreased from 221 to 214 procedures per 10,000 patients
within 4 years of baseline (ASC entry) while rates of markets that already had ASCs or did
5AHA (2006) notes the near exponential growth of these facilities: 68 facilities nationwide in 2000; 96
in 2002; 160 in 2005; and, 177 in 2006. These entities are however few in number when compared to the
general acute care hospitals, which number around the 3,000 mark over this period.
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not have ASCs exhibited statistically significant volume increases over the same period.
Hospitals could attempt to deter ASC entry. Incumbent responses to threats of entry
have been studied theoretically and empirically, under theories of entry deterrence or ac-
commodation. Empirical studies on entry deterrence and accommodation are relatively
sparse and largely focused on a few industries (e.g., pharmaceutical, casino, airline; Mor-
ton, 2000; Goolsbee and Syverson, 2008; Snider, 2009) and, generally, examine the role
of investments on future competitive play, including incumbent responses to entrant ca-
pacity, capital restructuring, advertising, lobbying efforts, and price play across multiple
industries.
Hospitals and hospital lobby groups like the American Hospital Association have qual-
ified ASC efficiency as an unfair advantage stemming from ASCs operating under less
regulation than hospitals,6 not being required to offer unprofitable services that community
hospitals provide, and ASC selection of more profitable patients (Casalino et al., 2003; Vogt
and Romley, 2009). Indeed, panelists in a 2003 FTC hearing on health care competition in-
dicated that hospital engagement in legislative efforts may have hindered ASC entry (FTC
and DOJ, 2004). Despite initial support of ASCs in the late 1990s (OIG, 1999), in 2002, the
OIG noted the importance of increased ASC oversight and lack of accountability to the gov-
ernment and public (OIG, 2002). Further, the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement,
and Modernization Act of 2003 (Modernization Act of 2003) froze ASC payment updates
until a new pricing structure could be established in 2008, also directing the Government
Accountability Office to examine differential costs of procedures as performed in ASCs and
6AHA (2006) provides a concise overview of the differential regulatory standards set by Medicare and at
federal and state levels.
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HOPDs to inform the new pricing structure. Ultimately, the new pricing structure, phased
in from 2008 through 2012, allowed for a more expansive array of surgeries to be covered
under Medicare, and phased in facility payment reductions for ASCs to approximately 60
percent7 of HOPD amounts (Munnich and Parente, 2014b; MedPAC, 2010). This price
differential clearly benefited HOPDs by affording them continued insurer reimbursements
that cover their marginal cost, allowing HOPDs to continue competing in outpatient surgi-
cal markets. Further, the uncertainty and ultimately lowering of ASC reimbursement levels
under the Modernization Act of 2003 might be seen as lobbying-based efforts to yield a
legislative entry deterrent. At the state level, certificate-of-need (CON) laws may similarly
act as an entry deterrent. CON laws are state-based laws that require health care providers
like hospitals to obtain permission before adding or expanding their facilities or service
provision. As Stratmann and Koopman (2016) point out, proponents of ASC regulation
under CON laws similarly cite concerns that ASC cream-skimming of profitable patients
and selective provision of profitable services leave hospitals with a less profitable patient
population that may result in hospital closure, particularly among hospitals with the lowest
profit margins, like rural hospitals. The authors further highlight the impact of CON laws
by noting that the 26 states that currently have ASC-specific CON laws in place have 14
percent fewer ASCs per capita as of 2016.8 In more recent years, post-2010, hospitals have
been encouraged to purchase ASCs as part of their hospital system (Taylor, 2017). Purchas-
ing or setting up an ASC may deter other ASC entry, as ASC entry decisions are sensitive
to ASC density (Al-Amin and Housman, 2012), and provide the purchasing hospital with
7Further expanding price differentials, in 2015, Congress cut ASC reimbursement to approximately 50
percent of HOPD reimbursement.
8The authors further note that CON laws may have actually decreased the number of hospitals as well
and may not be an appropriate tool to maintain access to care.
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more equitable competition in specific outpatient markets. Nationwide data indicate that
such investments were still rare in 2006, with less than 1 percent of hospitals (51 out of
5,557) having purchased or started an ASC.9 Recent legislative recommendations, how-
ever, aim to blur price differentials between HOPD and ASCs so that patients that may be
treated at either facility type would yield the same facility reimbursement amount, poten-
tially bolstering the business case for hospitals to acquire ASCs.
Dafny (2005)’s empirical examination of entry deterrence bears a particular relevance
to hospital-ASC competition. Dafny (2005) developed a three-period model of strategic in-
vestment that she applied to a specialty inpatient surgical procedure. The author employed
results from Ellison and Ellison (2011)10,11 to generate testable predictions for her model
and found evidence of entry-deterring investment that manifested in increases in surgical
volume (of a particular inpatient specialty surgery) for the first potential market entrant.
The author cites and summarizes a variety of strategies (strategic investments) provided
by hospital interest groups (e.g., the Advisory Board) that hospitals may employ to bolster
surgical volume, including increasing hospital capacity (an increase of inputs/providers)
and advertising, as mechanisms that hospitals may have engaged to increase their patient
volume. While not identifying the exact strategies employed by hospitals in her study, the
author’s evidence motivates volume-increasing investment as a form of entry deterrence.
These strategies are not specific to pre-entry threats and may also be leveraged by hospitals
9Source: analysis of Provider of Service data which details whether an ASC is ”hospital-based”.
10Dafny (2005) cites a 2000 MIT mimeo version of Ellison and Ellison (2011) that I was not able to
obtain.
11Ellison and Ellison (2011), for example, developed an approach for testing strategic entry deterrence that
revolves around market attractiveness. The authors showed that under certain conditions of market attractive-
ness or size, entry deterrent investments will be non-monotonic compared to non-deterrent accommodating
investments. Their empirical application of this theory was on the pharmaceutical industry.
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in their attempts to bolster output after entry occurs.
1.2 The Not-For-Profit Hospital
The existing literature on hospitals and ASCs accounts for hospital ownership implic-
itly if at all.12 Hospital characteristics like for-profit status, however, may inform hospital
objective functions and shape competitive responses.
The literature has theorized different objective functions for not-for-profit (NFP) hos-
pitals while for-profit (FP) hospitals are assumed to be profit-maximizers.13 Empirical
evidence provides mixed support for theories of NFP hospital behavior. The importance of
understanding NFP hospital behavior comes from its predominance in the United States rel-
ative to FP hospitals, accounting for approximately 75 percent of non-government general
hospitals in 2017 (AHA, 2017), a percentage that has held steady over the past few decades
(Horwitz and Nichols, 2007). The predominant NFP hospital structure and potential objec-
tives are particularly interesting in the outpatient market, where they face competition from
for-profit ASCs.
As Sloan (2000) points out, NFP and FP hospitals are similar in many ways, including
cost and revenue profiles. NFP hospitals, however, do differ from FP hospitals in a few
noteworthy ways, including the taxes paid and capital investment opportunities. The most
relevant difference, particularly in terms of optimization behavior and incentive structure,
is that FP hospitals generate profits for stakeholders. As profit-maximizers, FP hospitals
12Courtemanche and Plotzke, 2010, for example, specify a model that analyzes of hospital outpatient
volume with hospital fixed effects, which captures the time-invariant ownership status of hospitals in addition
to other time-invariant characteristics.
13Though not as straightforward as firms operating in perfect markets due to asymmetrical pricing infor-
mation, this profit structure positions FP hospitals as theoretically equivalent to any other profit-maximizing
firm.
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will select the most profitable patients and provide the most profitable mix of medical and
surgical services, given legislative and cost constraints. NFP hospitals, however, are known
to provide a fuller service range than FP hospitals to facilitate the needs of the community
they service. Competing theories of NFP hospital (behavior) and mixed empirical evidence
variously suggest that NFP hospitals are either output maximizers, profit maximizers, or
some mixture thereof.
The view of NFP hospitals as output maximizers has two veins in the theoretical lit-
erature. First, Newhouse (1970) proposed a model in which hospitals maximize quantity
and quality of care subject to a zero-profit constraint. Under this model, NFP hospitals will
offer services until profits are driven to zero. Other output maximization theories proffer
models in which NFP hospitals maximize total market output (Weisbrod, 1988) to, for ex-
ample, serve their local community, or as industry output maximizers that further respond
to nearby hospitals (Frank and Salkever, 1991).
Other literature proposes that NFP hospitals are simply FP hospitals in disguise, with a
different mechanism for distributing profits. Pauly and Redisch (1973), for example, pro-
pose multiple models under which profits manifest in stakeholders’ salaries or perks. Such
models have found real-world corroboration in recent years, given compensation packages
enjoyed by executives at NFP hospitals (Review, 2013).
Theoretical literature on hospitals indicate that as with other profit-maximizing firms,
FP hospitals, having selected and negotiated the profit-maximizing set of patients, proce-
dures, and insurer payments, will lose market share in a market where they face a far more
efficient profit-maximizing competitor and potentially exit the market. Other literature
notes that an NFP hospital operating under the typical NFP mission statement of provid-
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ing community-wide benefits (services) and not a profit-maximizing portfolio of services
may act as an FP hospital in the face of a financial shock. Dranove et al. (2017) and Dra-
nove (1988) posited that such responses to negative shocks may include reducing quality,
decreasing service provision, raising prices (cost-shifting), or decreasing charity care of-
ferings. Dranove (1988) developed a model for NFP hospitals in which NFP hospitals
optimize both output and profits, demonstrating a ”share the gain, share the pain” mech-
anism in which hospitals may increase prices to privately insured patients to offset reim-
bursement/payment cuts from other patients under other insurers (e.g., Medicare). Dranove
(1988) found evidence of this in Illinois in the 1980s and further notes this mechanism’s
dependence on hospital market power. More recently, Dranove et al. (2017) found limited
evidence of large NFP hospitals leveraging their size and reputation after the 2008 financial
crisis to negotiate prices with insurers, while other NFP hospitals reduced services avail-
able. In a review of the cost-shifting literature, Frakt (2011) similarly notes that, while
possibly due to payment policy changes, cost-shifting is not as pervasive as perceived and
its potential existence is contaminant with other structural changes and market power bal-
ances that hospitals may have with payers.
Horwitz and Nichols (2007) discussed predominant theories of NFP hospital objectives
and designed an empirical study aimed at identifying evidence to support one or more of
these theories. As such, the authors’ work is particularly relevant to my work in Chapter
2 and I expound on their work further here. Horwitz and Nichols (2007) used profitability
rankings across medical services such as imaging and outpatient surgery14 and examined
14Ranking profitability was a rather complex process detailed in Horwitz (2005), and was based on inter-
views and policy reports, among other sources. Horwitz (2005) incorporates into its profitability assessment
insurer coverage. For example, the authors considered that medical services with limited (government-only)
or no insurance coverage are likely less profitable for medical providers. This profitability assessment is
12
whether hospitals’ service provision varied by hospital ownership and market ownership
mix – as measured by FP hospital density in a given market. The authors found that NFP
hospital service provision did vary by FP market mix, such that NFP hospitals in markets
with high concentrations of FP hospitals are more likely to offer relatively profitable ser-
vices and less likely to offer unprofitable services, noting the potential for unobserved mar-
ket heterogeneity may differentially attract FP and NFP hospitals. The authors concluded
that their evidence aligned ”best” with hospital output maximization theories or theories in
which some NFP hospitals are output maximizers. This conclusion stemmed from a rejec-
tion of market-output maximization in which hospitals, optimizing across their community
needs, would be more likely to offer relatively less-profitable services to ”compensate for
deficiencies in service provision by neighboring for-profits.” Given their estimation strat-
egy of whether a particular service was provided and not the magnitude of such provision,
this rationale assumes that responses to such deficiencies require new service provision
as opposed to increases in existing service provision.15 The authors further noted a lack
of support for profit-maximization theories despite their findings of increased provision of
relatively profitable services in select markets where for-profit penetration was high. The
authors arrived at this determination because NFP hospitals exhibited a different service
mix than FP hospitals that better aligns with NFP hospital objectives of providing commu-
nity services, instead of exhibiting a service mix similar to FP hospitals.
In their consideration of the aggregate outpatient market, the authors found evidence
service-based, and, therefore, not necessarily sensitive to hospital-specific service profitability that may be
influenced by a hospital’s specific patient-insurer mix. Horwitz and Nichols (2007) did include proxies for
insurance status by employment into some of their models.
15Further, as the authors noted, they did not account for legislative requirements behind service provisions
(e.g., need assessments of NFP hospitals or CON laws).
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that NFP hospitals maximize their own output instead of profit. The authors were unable
to determine the profitability of the aggregate outpatient market in particular, and their re-
sults indicated a decreased propensity of FP hospitals to provide outpatient services and
insignificant findings for NFP hospitals relative to for-profit market saturation.16 The au-
thors’ study did not account for existence or growth of for-profit ASCs in their measure of
for-profit market density.
My study in Chapter 2 contributes to both the literatures studying ASCs and NFP hos-
pital behavior by examining markets of increasing importance, outpatient surgical markets,
and considering how NFP hospital outpatient surgical provision responds to the entry of su-
perior competitors. First, I expand on previous studies that examine the effect of ASCs on
aggregate HOPD volume by examining specific surgical markets. This examination is rel-
evant because ASCs, ASC growth, and insurer reimbursement rates vary by ASC surgical
specialization, implying varied competition within a hospital’s surgical outpatient offer-
ings. Second, I examine whether these effects differ by FP and NFP ownership status and,
in doing so, consider predominant theories of the NFP hospital in the outpatient surgical
market.
16T-statistics are not provided for the outpatient market NFP estimate; the point estimate is -0.013
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Chapter 2: Examination of Specific Surgical Markets Facing Compe-
tition by Ownership Status
The advent of medical technology and changing medical practice has transitioned sur-
gical procedures once performed only in full scale inpatient settings to outpatient settings.
The efficiency inherent in same-day outpatient surgical procedures that have low compli-
cation rates make this a profitable market. Ambulatory Surgical Centers have grown in
number nationally and captured large portions of select outpatient markets, making them
principal competitors in markets that are critical to hospitals’ revenue streams. Indeed, hos-
pitals have claimed the revenue from their outpatient departments and specialty services as
offsets for their care of uninsured patients, with anecdotal evidence pointing to strategic
pricing increases or changes to output service offerings, including the shuttering of ser-
vice types, in response to specialty competitors, and other evidence indicating a variety of
lobbying and legislative-based responses (Chapter 1). Revenue shares of outpatient and
inpatient care point to a continued transition of and reliance on revenue from outpatient
markets. MedPAC (2017), for example, notes a continued decrease in hospital revenue
share from Medicare inpatient procedures (71 to 60 percent) from 2010 to 2015 and an
increase in revenue share in outpatient procedures (21 percent to 28 percent) over the same
period.
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Understanding how hospitals are impacted by ASCs and respond to the presence of
ASCs is particularly relevant in recent years, with payment/reimbursement proposals that
aim to reduce payments to hospitals servicing the outpatient market (OIG, 2016; CMS,
2016). I examine in this chapter the relationship between hospital outpatient surgical ser-
vice provision and hospital ownership in the face of competition from for-profit specialized
outpatient service providers, ASCs, that are more efficient in their provision of surgical
services and are of lower cost to insurers and patient consumers than hospital providers.
Under normal market conditions, hospital providers would ultimately exit outpatient
markets that ASCs enter. Hospitals have, however, remained in outpatient markets and
increased their revenue share from outpatient services due in part to market interventions
that include higher insurer payments to hospitals (relative to ASCs) for a given surgical ser-
vice and state-based legislation that restricts ASC entry. As noted in Chapter 1, ASCs may
provide multiple specialties but are more likely to specialize in a specific class of outpa-
tient surgeries. Hospitals, conversely, tend to provide a wider breadth of outpatient surgical
procedures. Additionally, while hospitals vary in their ownership structure (e.g., for-profit,
not-for-profit, or government-owned), ASCs are predominately for-profit entities.
Existing literature studying outpatient surgical procedures has considered these varied
surgical procedures as an aggregate market or has focused on a singular outpatient surgical
procedure in isolation. Generally, the former vein of literature masks the notable differ-
ences in revenue, cost, and specialized inputs across outpatient surgical services, and the
latter ignores cross-resource constraints of outpatient services that are provided at the same
hospital. Courtemanche and Plotzke (2010) and Bian and Morrisey (2007), for example,
found at varying market geographies that neighboring ASC presence was associated with
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decreases in hospital outpatient market provision. The authors in these studies did not,
however, account for ASC specialization in their examination of aggregate HOPD outpa-
tient output, nor did the authors differentiate effects of ASCs by ownership status. Another
stream of literature notes that hospital responses to competition may vary by ownership
status. While for-profit hospitals are assumed to follow profit-maximizing behavior, not-
for-profit hospital objectives may differ, as evidenced by various theories and empirical
studies.
My study deviates from existing literature by examining whether changes over time
in surgical volume (output) in hospital outpatient market segments are associated with the
presence of ASC competitors, and how such associations differ by hospital ownership type.
I identify meaningful segments in the outpatient surgical market by using an existing surgi-
cal classification system that groups similar surgical procedures and focus on the groupings
that are the most prevalent in the outpatient market over my study time frame. I further ex-
amine whether the hospital-ASC relationship across market segments differs by hospital
ownership status. My measures of focus include how hospital outpatient surgery outputs,
inputs, and patient mix are associated with presence of ASCs in reduced form models.
There are other facets over which competition between hospitals and ambulatory cen-
ters may occur, such as quality and price. Hospital and ASC quality, for example, may
impact a consumer’s choice of health care facility, particularly for the non-emergency out-
patient services I study.1 Some studies that have considered competition along a quality
dimension have approximated quality with volume under hypotheses that link volume to
1Competition in the quality dimension does assume at least some visibility of such information to the
consumer or, for example, that quality information is relayed through physician recommendation.
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quality-increasing experience. Other studies have measured quality as safety or health out-
come scores of health care providers or entities. A working paper by Dua and Fournier
(2010), for example, examined the growth of ASCs as they relate to hospital quality, as
measured by surgical complication rates and safety rates related to nursing activity.2 While
certainly a notable dimension of competition in the health care sector, I examine hospital
outpatient volume directly and note that (1) quality among hospitals and ASCs, as mea-
sured by factors more relevant to hospital-ASC competition such as patient waiting time
and complication rates, have already been studied in recent years and indicate that ASCs
provide superior quality (e.g., Munnich and Parente, 2014a; Munnich and Parente, 2014b),3
and (2) ASC quality measures became publicly available largely after my study period
(post-2010).4
Prices in the health care sector are largely unobserved by consumers/patients, compli-
cating analysis of competition for consumers among the price dimension. This dimension
is further complicated by the fact that insurers set prices that consumers pay, including
consumer premiums, deductibles, and copays, while also negotiating with medical and sur-
gical providers for direct payment to providers. Regardless, examining the price dimension
would generally be informative about potential hospital competitive strategies. Unfortu-
nately, the data I use for this study do not contain actual prices paid for surgical services
that patients receive, preventing my examination of the price dimension. A recent study
2The author does not pinpoint the mechanism for this influence; e.g., whether it stemmed from physicians
that may have worked both at a hospital and an ASC.
3Some studies note that lower complication rates may be a factor of the healthier population that ASCs
tend to serve.
4Admittedly, even if quality measures that allowed consumers to differentiate between hospitals and
ASCs were not publicly available, consumers may still have received such information from their health care
providers (e.g., physicians).
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does imply the limited value of pricing strategies in hospital-ASC competition due to hos-
pitals’ loss of negotiating power among private insurers when ASCs are present in a market
(Carey, 2017). This loss of pricing power is likely attributable to ASCs’ assumed lower
cost, yielding lower prices relative to hospitals (i.e., lower insurer reimbursement (across
insurers) and patient copays). This limited value in pricing strategies is furthered by fixed
procedure pricing schedules of a large insurer, Medicare, whose reimbursement does not
vary by patient health status.5 I do nevertheless consider two ordinal price structures across
outpatient surgical market segments and across patient consumers of such services to pro-
vide insight into revenue that hospitals may generate from heterogeneous consumers and
across outpatient procedure classes. Specifically, I rank patient revenue by insurance type,
using the following order Private > Government ≥ Other > Uninsured,6 given the
generally higher reimbursement rate of private/commercial insurers relative to government-
provided insurance (e.g., AHIP, 2016; Carey, 2015). Other literature motivates this ranking
implicitly as a ranking of profitability within findings of asymmetric patient-insurer com-
position between ASCs and hospitals, with ASCs servicing a larger portion of privately
insured and healthier patients relative to hospitals. There is also evidence of revenue dif-
ferentials among outpatient surgical procedures and classes of procedures. Munnich and
Parente (2014b), for example, details Medicare facility payments over a portion of my 2000
- 2009 study period, 2007 - 2009, for the five highest volume ASC procedures among Medi-
care patients.7 Four of these five ASC procedures are also included in the top 5 procedures
5Medicare updates its reimbursement rates for outpatient surgery yearly, as with other hospital services.
Private insurer updates, made through hospital-insurer negotiations, however, may result in longer multi-year
contracts, as evidenced by industry recommendations to hospitals (Review, 2011).
6The ”Other” insurance category includes reimbursement from Workers’ Compensation or Indian Health
Service, for example. The ”Uninsured” category also includes charity care from hospital providers.
7Note that only Medicare facility payments to ASCs were frozen from 2003 through 2007; thus, this
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among patients from all insurers among both HOPDs and ASCs in my data (see Section
2.2.2), which account for over half of all specialty procedures among HOPDs in my study
(Table 2.4).8 Munnich and Parente (2014b) note that the ASC-to-HOPD payment ratios are
highest for minor musculoskeletal procedures, second highest for gastroenterology proce-
dures, and third highest for opthalmologic procedures – which coincide with the outpatient
surgical market segments that I study in this chapter. While this revenue ranking does not
necessarily carry over to profitability, the lower costs that ASCs have relative to hospitals
are not in dispute.9
In addition to hospital volume in the aggregate and within outpatient market segments,
I also study patient health status, as measured by a comorbidity index, and inputs to outpa-
tient surgical provision, as measured by the density of physicians serving a given market.
Even if reimbursement does not vary by patient health status, as with Medicare reimburse-
ment for outpatient surgeries, patient health status may be indicative of a potentially more
costly effort for patients of poorer health, as such patients may have a greater propensity for
post-surgical complications, yielding potential incentives for hospital selection of healthier
patients. My examination of physician inputs is meant to identify any changes that might
3-year period covers the majority of my study period.
8Plotzke and Courtemanche (2011) also estimated profitability rates of popular ASC procedures, includ-
ing key procedures covered in similar markets. The authors’ measures similarly used Medicare facility fee
reimbursement rates. However, the authors’ assumed the median HOPD cost for a given procedure would
determine one ASC profitability measure, following an estimation suggestion from MedPAC 2014 in their
continual attempts to estimate unknown ASCs costs. As noted in MedPAC (2017), CMS does not collect
ASC cost data due to industry push back. The authors do construct a different ASC profitability measure that
is based on an unsuccessful payment classification system that CMS attempted to implement in the 1990s.
9In the absence of actual costs data, the relative difference in costs between ASCs and hospitals can at
best be imperfectly approximated (MedPAC, 2017). There is, however, other evidence that ASCs have a
lower cost structure than HOPDs. As Pallardy (2015) notes, approximately 30 percent of ASC patients have
Medicare/Medicaid as their insurer. Further, Medicare reimbursement to ASCs has experienced a steady
decline since 2003 from 87 percent of HOPD reimbursement to 58 percent in 2010. However, as indicated in
Chapter 1, the approximate increase in ASC facilities over this time period increased by over 60 percent.
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speak to findings on hospital surgical volume from my models and would otherwise be
directly included in a structural approach.
Theoretical literature cited in Chapter 1 is consistent on the profit-seeking motives of
FP hospitals and mixed in defining NFP maximization objectives. Further, NFP theo-
ries are principally based on hospital-to-hospital competition or non-competition (finan-
cial/legislative) shocks. Generally, the theoretical literature on NFP hospitals indicates that
these hospitals may seek to maximize some combination of reputation/quality and output,
revenue, and/or profits, with the latter objective liking NFP hospitals to their FP counter-
parts. More specifically, different veins of literature can be classified as NFP hospitals
maximizing (1) profit as for-profit hospitals do, (2) their own output subject to a zero-profit
constraint, (3) output subject to the needs of the community they serve, or (4) revenue
subject to some other requirements, such as accreditation. Additionally, some literature
suggests hybrid NFP hospital objectives. For example, Dranove et al. (2017) found mixed
evidence of pricing behavior heterogeneity among NFP hospitals, in that select hospitals,
those with name brand recognition, for example, may switch from quality/quantity max-
imization to profit maximization in the face of financial shocks. In examining select di-
mensions of competition across output market segments, I test competing theories and use
empirical tools developed by existing work studying not-for-profit (NFP) hospitals. The
first three of these classifications I expound on in describing my conceptual framework,
leveraging Horwitz and Nichols (2007)’s work, and I motivate the fourth classification as a
modification on Finkler (1983)’s model of hospitals as revenue maximizers.
My study explores hospital-driven responses and indicates that hospitals may respond to
ASC presence in ways that are (1) market-specific and (2) vary by ownership type. Market-
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specific effects are not unexpected but have not been fully studied for outpatient markets.
My results do not show statistically robust differential associations across HOPD specialty
markets in competition with ASCs. However, further examination of state-level data from
Florida, which holds a near-even mix of hospitals with for-profit and not-for-profit status,
does indicate differential associations between for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals and
ASC presence across surgical markets that may be relevant to understanding how hospitals
will react to the changing legislative landscape that defines their competition with ASCs.
Theoretical and empirical literature are consistent on FP hospital profit-maximizing objec-
tives and mixed on NFP hospital objectives. Though not causal, my results are consistent
with the negative relationship between FP hospital output and ASC presence. My results
also identify differential responses between FP and NFP hospitals to ASC presence, sug-
gesting that NFP hospitals are able to retain their market share more often than not despite
ASC presence, and actually increase patient volume in non-specialty markets, where hos-
pitals appear to face less ASC competition. These findings speak to NFP hospitals as (1)
potential revenue maximizers or (2) as entities who service patients that are not sought after
by ASCs. The latter finding is suggested by the fact that FP hospitals lose significant pri-
vate and government- insured patient volume in the presence of ASCs while not-for-profits
demonstrate an ability to hold the status quo of their patient population in surgical markets
facing ASC competition. This finding aligns with previous studies that find that not-for-
profit medical providers tend to serve a different mix of patients than for-profit providers.
This result, however, may not hold in other states, where the ratio of not-for-profit hospi-
tals to for-profit hospitals is more akin to the national ratio, in which not-for-profit hospitals
dominate. This latter finding is apparent among hospital outpatient market segments that
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are in clear competition with ASCs. My examination of a market segment with potentially
limited competition from ASCs is suggestive of revenue-maximizing behavior among NFP
hospitals. Changes in this ”other” market are indicative of continued surgical market trends
that are selectively adopted by NFP hospitals; namely, continual shifts of procedures from
inpatient care to outpatient settings. Determining whether such expansion from techno-
logical adaption is the cause for increases seen in this other market among not-for-profit
hospitals, however, requires further research.
Next, I motivate the conceptual framework for my empirical analyses.
2.1 Conceptual Framework
My motivation for segmenting the outpatient surgical market is straightforward. There
exist classes of outpatient surgical services that vary by profitability, revenue, cost, and spe-
cialized inputs. As noted earlier in this chapter, for example, hospital and ASC providers
receive different reimbursement rates for opthalmologic procedures and neuromuscular
procedures. Further, these procedure classes require different specialization of inputs -
specifically, the specialization of physicians that provide such services and technological
equipment/capital required. Another important aspect of my analysis concerns how hospi-
tals optimize these inputs and outputs.
As with most research on NFP hospitals, Horwitz and Nichols (2007) maintained in
their study the popular assumption that hospitals, or rather hospital administrators, are the
driving force behind service provision.10 While administrators may indeed provide ap-
10Pauly and Redisch (1973)’s theory of NPFs’ as profit-maximizers is a notable deviation from this pop-
ular assumption in which physicians capture NFP rents.
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proval for service provision, physicians and other medical providers drive the actual health
care provision/output as inputs. This consideration is particularly relevant in a competitive
environment in which production inputs, namely the physicians, may have competing in-
centives that direct where they supply their services such as multiple facility affiliations or
profit-sharing stakes in other facilities such as specialty hospitals or ASCs. Indeed, the con-
sideration of physicians as a driving force for service provision is particularly relevant in
today’s health care markets given physician ownership of ASCs and hospitals’ and insurers’
perennial attempts to align physician interests with their own.11 I modify the assumptions
in Finkler (1983)’s model of NFP hospitals as a revenue maximizer to account for such
considerations while also allowing me to consider revenue maximization with community
service provision constraints in a health care market where cost and profitability are gener-
ally obscured. Finkler (1983) modeled hospital demand as a function of price, p, and the
number of physicians affiliated with a hospital, M , as q = q(p,M) and the hospital as a




s.t p(q)q − C(q) = 0 (2.2)
Finkler (1983) assumes that increases in the number of physicians increases the number
of services ( δq
δM
> 0) for finite patient demand (q(0,M) <∞), which in turn increases pa-
tient demand across services, hospital-wide. Further, to accommodate the potential for NFP
11Examples include current bundled payment models and preceding physician collaborative models that
Medicare and private insurers have tested.
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hospitals to provide unprofitable services, he notes a required minimum volume threshold
Ji for service i that facilitates hospitals’ accreditation in service i, which may not be bind-
ing.12 Finkler (1983) also assumes that the percentage of patients referred to hospitals un-
affiliated with the physician (R) and the scope (S) of services offered at affiliated hospitals
are negatively related, δR
δS
< 0. Another key assumption is that the number of physicians
increases when scope increases, δM
δS
> 0. Finkler (1983) motivates these assumptions for a
hospital setting and in hospital competition with other hospitals.
These assumptions, however, might not hold in today’s provider market, which is one
of increasing physician provider specialization (Barbey et al., 2017) and competition from
specialty facility providers like ASCs and specialty hospitals. To account for these modern
considerations, I consider a simple modification to the definition of Finkler (1983)’s S, the
scope of services at a hospital, such that S is instead qualified as the scope of services
provided at a hospital within a given physician’s specialization. This qualification retains
the plausibility of δR
δS
< 0 and δM
δS
> 0, particularly in the outpatient markets I study. In
my qualification of S, δR
δS
< 0 is still a plausible assumption as physicians would be more
likely to refer patients to hospitals (or ASCs) that they are affiliated with if the facility in
question has a greater scope of specialty services, which implies a greater capacity to treat
a wider variety of patients and patient needs. Increases in S could include adoption of new
technology and/or innovative medical practices that support service scope expansion, either
of which would speak to a physicians’ profit- or prestige-maximizing motives captured by
Finkler (1983)’s δM
δS
> 0 assumption (and indeed, in line with the original rationale for this
12Finkler (1983)’s rationale for this constraint not being binding (in practice) is based on findings from
Finkler (1979)’s study for a particular inpatient surgery, heart surgery.
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assumption).13
I further re-parameterize Finkler (1983)’s price, p as a vector ~p that accounts for reim-
bursements that differ by insurers and across outpatient surgical market types. Medicare re-
imbursement rates for procedures, for example, are set yearly (CMS, 2017) and are distinct
from hospital reimbursement negotiations of multi-year contracts with private/commercial
insurers (Review, 2011). Given such price setting, a single-insurer, single-product version
of this model effectively reduces NFP hospitals to output maximizers14 subject to threshold
minimums (J) and a zero-profit budget constraint, with threshold minimums corresponding
to NFP hospital community requirements (e.g., level of charity care or service provision).
This consideration of J as a community-based minimum for select NFP hospital services is
a deviation from Finkler (1983)’s context of accreditation minimums, but serves the same
purpose as a firm’s minimum sales constraint.
Given this re-parameterization of Finkler (1983)’s model, I am able to make predictions
on hospital output and other factors I consider in my study. First, however, I consider al-
ternative NFP hospital theories. As profit-maximizers, when faced with a more efficient
FP competitor in a given market, FP hospitals will lose patients to that competitor. Specifi-
13In my conceptual model variant, physicians still drive production. As ASC owners, physicians will
have additional incentive not considered in Finkler (1983)’s original model in which NFP hospitals compete
against other hospitals. This additional incentive comes from the ability of ASC physician owners to extract
rents from the ASC facility fees (one part of insurer reimbursements) in addition to their individual fee. How
does such reimbursement contend with the profit-seeking motives of physicians under this model? First, it
should be noted that not all physicians would be associated with or have ownership of a neighboring ASC,
particularly with the growth of direct employment of physicians by hospitals over the past decade (current
rates at around 33 percent of physicians; Kane (2017)). Second, previous research has shown that even
physicians with ASC affiliation may still service patients at hospitals. Such physicians, typically referred to
as splitters, are, however, more likely to treat more complex cases at hospitals (David and Neuman, 2011).
This preference coincides with physicians having preference for a greater scope, S, of services, as for more
complex patients, some services isolated to hospitals (e.g., emergency department services) might better serve
more complex patients.
14Or, as revenue maximizers if output is normalized in terms of dollars.
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cally, they will lose their most profitable patients in the market segment in which hospitals
face competition and most likely face such competition in the most profitable markets. This
assertion holds in the case where demand for services within the market in question is al-
ready met by a FP hospital. If, however, demand for services in that market is in excess
of supply, the new competitor may extract patients from this excess to the point where
the marginal patient profitability meets that of patients the FP hospital currently serves.
The competitor may then co-opt the most profitable patients that the FP hospital services
if its capacity allows. In my study, one mechanism in which ASCs could extract patients
would be through physicians that hold positions in both ASCs and hospitals. The incen-
tive for physicians may come from ASCs having a greater, relevant scope of services (S)
or, for physicians with ASC ownership, the added financial incentive from the facility fee
they would get in addition to their facility-agnostic payments. Indeed, literature cited in
Chapter 1 notes this choice among physicians and further notes that among physicians that
provide services at both ASCs and hospitals (”splitters”), patient/service volume at hospi-
tals tends to decrease, with such changes considered expected due to the added (financial)
value for physicians to provide services at ASCs.15 Other mechanisms for ASC patient
capture would include those used in hospital-to-hospital competition, such as advertising,
as discussed in Chapter 1. Ultimately, with profit-maximizing objectives, NFP hospitals
would exhibit a similar outpatient market service provision and insurer patient mix, or even
patient mix on other factors like health, to FP hospitals. Given these similarities, NFP
hospitals would evidence a relationship akin to that between ASCs and FP hospitals. If,
15This added value may come from time saved due to more efficient processing of patients (e.g., shorter
wait times) and additional revenue to physicians that have ownership stakes in ASCs.
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however, NFP hospitals were only sometimes profit-maximizers, when faced with shocks,
then I would expect to see a tendency towards FP hospital service or patient mixes. Dranove
et al. (2017) and Duggan (2002), for example, found (limited) evidence for NFP hospital
responsiveness to financial shocks and FP hospital density. Under output maximization
theories such as Newhouse (1970), an NFP hospital would have maximized output to the
point of zero profit. As noted in Horwitz and Nichols (2007), Finkler (1983), and other
works, neighboring for-profit entities will distort the NFP hospital’s pool of patients by
co-opting the most profitable patients. This scenario extends to the for-profit ASCs poten-
tially capturing the most profitable patients from NFP (and FP) hospitals. As a result of
such capture, the NFP output maximization theories predict that the NFP hospital may aim
to increase its provision of profitable services or decrease its provision of less profitable
services to maintain its zero-profit constraint.16 In a stark example, if a neighboring ASC
captured the entirety of an NFP hospital’s most profitable outpatient market segment, then
the NFP might minimize its provision of its least profitable outpatient market segment.17
Under market output maximization, an NFP hospital would service more unprofitable
patients to better capture the pool of patients not served by for-profit ASCs. This particular
type of scenario would occur if it is evident that incoming ASCs are filling unmet demand
but limiting such provision to only profitable patients, and is a financially feasible option
for the NFP hospital. Otherwise, even the market output maximizing NFP hospital would
default to the outpatient maximizing objective to the extent community constraints allow.
16Indeed, this may be seen as a localized profit-maximization within the space that gets the NFP hospital
back to the zero-profit constraint, having lost some of its profitable patients.
17In practice, a hospital may instead reduce other segments of its services like those in its inpatient setting.
I limit this example of counterbalancing to the outpatient market given the likely smaller divestment of an
outpatient market segment that consist of non-emergent services versus an inpatient segment like cardiac
services that may have larger ramifications to the hospital (e.g., reputation or accreditation loss).
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Under Finkler, a revenue-maximizing NFP hospital will optimally select the highest
revenue patients among the markets it services, prioritizing higher revenue markets. In a
market where the NFP hospital loses patients to a for-profit ASC, the NFP hospital will
continue to provide services to that market so long as average revenue equals average cost.
Unlike other models, like those of output maximization, this physician-driven model al-
lows the hospital to pursue new markets/services, even up to a certain threshold for loss,
as such a pursuit would expand the scope of services the NFP hospital provides and con-





> 0), ultimately increasing hospital revenue. This mechanism also allows
for new market entry that comes about due to technological advancements, in which service
provision may initially be provided by the NFP hospital as a loss, to a hospital’s break even
point. The outpatient surgical market is prime for such adoption given the continual transi-
tion of procedures from inpatient to outpatient settings due to advances in surgical and care
technologies. Indeed, Medicare led by example in the trend of shifting from inpatient to
outpatient, covering procedures first in hospital outpatient departments and then ASCs.18
Private insurers follow. Given the lower reimbursement rates of Medicare relative to private
insurers, this implies that new markets opening due to new technological advances may not
yield high revenue or profitability initially. NFP hospitals are more likely to be teaching
hospitals, invest tax deferred dollars, and are required to meet potentially diverse commu-
nity needs, all of which are characteristics that bolster the need for adopting technological
advancements. Parente and Van Horn (2006) found that the reasons for use of technology
18An example of this can be seen in the ”New Technology Add-on” payments that Medicare provides for
leveraging new technologies in practice, and in recent, 2017, legislation for total knee replacements – the
topic of my third chapter in this dissertation.)
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differed by hospital ownership status, providing evidence for this narrative. Specifically,
in a nationwide sample of U.S. hospitals in the 1990s, Parente and Van Horn (2006) found
that FP hospitals used information technology systems to boost hospital productivity in
ways that decreased cost (e.g., increasing patient turnover19), while NFP hospitals used
such technology to increase the quantity of their services.20 Further bolstering this narra-
tive is a survey of NFP hospital executives that notes expansion of outpatient capacity as a
top investment priority (Ratings, 2015).
Given physician-driven output of ASCs and hospital volume and their relevance in Fin-
kler (1983)’s model, it is worth discussing potential profit-maximizing motives of physi-
cians. Unless otherwise constrained, profit-maximizing physicians would opt to extract
rents of privately insured patients first (and potentially only). Corner solutions where
physicians only service such patients, however, are unlikely given (1) the service provision
minimum requirement threshold, J , that allows for potentially non-profitable, community-
needed services, (2) the mix of patient insurers available in the community to which a hos-
pital provides services, and (3) the increasing existence of hospital-physician employment
contracts noted earlier that align physician incentives more closely with hospital incentives.
2.2 Data
I used 100 percent of the outpatient claims data from Florida’s Agency for Health Care
Administration (AHCA) from 2000 through 2009 to obtain information on surgical services
provided, their dates (calendar quarter),21 the type and number of services provided for
19The cost component in this example would come from reducing a patient’s length of stay.
20Note that such use of technology and higher insurer reimbursements relative to ASCs may explain, at
least in part, how for-profits continue to survive in the outpatient market.
21The exact date of service is not provided due to privacy concerns.
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patient visits, patient insurer or lack thereof, and accompanying patient diagnoses.
These data have several favorable attributes. First, hospital outpatient departments
(HOPDs)22 and ASCs in Florida are not impacted by Certificate of Need (CON) Laws that
otherwise impact hospital service provision in Florida. Second, unlike nationwide statistics
where the overwhelming majority of hospitals are NFPs, Florida has an almost even mix
of private NFP and FP hospitals.23 Third, Florida is second only to California in terms of
ASC growth and number24 over the time period of my study, 2000 through 2009. I note also
that the non-emergency nature of surgical outpatient markets allows me to observe hospital
output in markets that are not mired in legal requirements such as the 1985 Emergency
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, which requires hospitals to provide emergency
care to patients, regardless of ability to pay.
I linked these AHCA data to the American Hospital Association Annual Survey (AHA)
via hospital provider identification codes for years 2000 to 2009 to obtain hospital charac-
teristics such as size (in terms of bed count), number of physicians, and ownership charac-
teristics. I then used ZIP Codes and county identifiers to link AHA and AHCA data with
the county-level population data discussed next.
I obtained county-level total and age-stratified population numbers (in 100,000) for
relevant study years from the U.S. Census Bureau. Data on the percentage of individuals
living under the poverty level and estimated median household income come from the
U.S. Census Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates. Finally, county-level estimates of
22Hospital outpatient surgical categories that face direct competition from ASCs are not currently re-
stricted by CON laws in Florida; other hospital services like rehabilitation, and psychiatric services are im-
pacted by Florida CON law in 2010.
23Local and government hospitals, which I do not study, comprise less than 10 percent of the hospital
population in the state.
24http://www.ascassociation.org/advancingsurgicalcare/whatisanasc/numberofascsperstate
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individuals without health insurance are also obtained from the U.S. Census’ Small Area
Health Insurance Estimates (SAHIE). The SAHIE are only provided for the years 2007,
2006, 2005, and 2000. I populate years 2001 to 2004 with year 2000 data and years 2008
and 2009 with year 2007 data. I used data from the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s
Economic Research Service to classify hospitals as urban or rural. I classify a hospital
as urban if its Rural-Urban Continuum Code signifies that the metropolitan area has a
population of at least 250,000.
2.2.1 Geographic Boundaries
Previous literature on hospital-hospital and ASC-hospital competition focuses on pre-
defined geographic regions. Examples of such geographies include population- or legal-
based geographies such as metropolitan statistical areas (MSA) or counties, medical service
provision-based geographies such as hospital referral regions (HRRs), or hospital service
areas (HSAs). HRRs are defined to capture inpatient hospital referral regions of patients for
specific procedures (e.g., cardiovascular surgical procedures), while HSAs are a collection
of ZIP Codes whose residents receive most of their hospitalization from the hospital facil-
ities in that area. HSA markets are smaller than MSAs and allow for contiguous patient
density spaces relative to county lines. Further, unlike HRRs, which also rely on patient
densities for select procedures, HSAs provide geographical boundaries that include areas
where patients received primary health care, including outpatient surgical procedures con-
sidered low-risk and potentially discretionary (relative to inpatient procedures). Given my
focus on outpatient surgical procedures that are non-emergency, I also use HSA boundaries
to define HOPD and ASC markets in this study. As HOPDs and ASCs may span multiple
32
counties, I create HSA-level characteristics by averaging characteristics of patient popula-
tions for HOPDs and ASCs and compute the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) as the sum
of the squared market share of HOPDs and ASCs in a given year, for each HSA and out-
patient surgical market classification (discussed in Section 2.2.2). The HSA geographical
boundaries do differ from those used in studies examining the relationship between HOPDs
and ASCs from state-level markets (Koenig and Gu, 2013), to MSAs (Bian and Morrisey,
2007), to localized radii (e.g., 15 miles or variable radii; Courtemanche and Plotzke, 2010),
with only the first separating out key surgical procedures that ASCs pursue.25 Other litera-
ture, however, validates my use of HSA geographies. Specifically, Al-Amin and Housman
(2012) and Suskind et al. (2015) examined the survival rates of HOPDs due to ASC pres-
ence and diffusion of ASCs based on HSA market conditions, selecting HSAs for reasons
I put forth above.
2.2.2 Surgical Markets
The Ambulatory Surgical Center Association (ASCA, 2016) notes that ASCs tend to
specialize in pain management, urology, orthopedic (MSK), gastrointestinal (GS), opthal-
mologic (EYE), and other specialties; with GS, EYE, and orthopedic/neurological surg-
eries being among the most prevalent (MedPAC, 2013). To separate the outpatient market
into segments that account for predominant ASC specialties, I rely on established clini-
cal and surgical classification systems. The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
(AHRQ) developed Clinical Condition Service categories (CCS) that categorize surgical
and diagnostic procedures into clinically meaningful groups (AHRQ, 2016). AHRQ has
25These singular procedures include cataract surgery, gastrointestinal procedures, and arthroscopic (or-
thopedic) procedures.
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established two levels of CCS categorizations. Level 1 CCS categories identify specific
(surgical) procedures, while Level 2 CCS categories group surgical operations by body
system. Table 2.1, for example, shows Level 1 condition category procedures for the Level
2 CCS body system – opthalmologic (EYE) procedures. I apply CCS to the principal pro-
cedure code on a service claim.
Table 2.1
Condition Classification System - EYE
Classification Number Classification Description
13 Corneal transplant
14 Glaucoma procedures
15 Lens and cataract procedures
16 Repair of retinal tear; detachment
17 Destruction of lesion of retina and choroid
18 Diagnostic procedures on eye
19 Other therapeutic procedures on eyelids; conjunctiva; cornea
20 Other intra ocular therapeutic procedures
21 Other extra-ocular muscle and orbit therapeutic procedures
Notes: This category extract is taken from the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality’s Clinical Classi-
fications Software, available at https://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/toolssoftware/ccs/ccs.jsp.
I use both levels of CCS categories to identify and examine the most common ASC
outpatient markets. This translates to an examination of the nervous system (CCS Level 2
#1), neuron-musculoskeletal system (CCS Level 2 #14; NMK), ocular system (CCS Level 2
#3; EYE), and digestive system (CCS Level 2 #9; GS) outpatient surgical market segments.
I further consider a catch-all category of all other procedures (”OTHER”).26 Table 2.2
shows the number of patient visits where the principal procedure is categorized into one
of the three specialty market segments or the catch-all27 over my study period. Among all
26Examples of procedures in this category include debridement of wounds and tonsillectomies.
27An examination of secondary procedures shows procedures that are within the same CCS category and
of related surgical or imaging/diagnostic procedures. Moreover, the overwhelming majority of claims in the
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HOPDs, EYE, GS, and NMK procedures exhibited relatively monotonic decreases over the
10-year period ranging from a 34 (EYE) to 10 (GS) percent change. The trend for the catch-
all market OTHER, however, exhibited a 12 percent increase, contributing heavily to an
overall stable trend in total surgical volume (+1 percent change). The trends for FP HOPDs
across specialty market segments that face competition are more dramatic than those for
NFP HOPDs, with FP HOPDs facing percent changes from -56 (EYE) to -23 (NMK).
NFP HOPDs exhibited decreases to a lesser extent over time ranging from -19 (EYE) to
-1 (GS) percent, with GS and NMK volume exhibiting declines followed by recoveries
for NFP hospitals. The OTHER market also exhibited differential growth between FP and
NFP hospitals, with these types of hospitals exhibiting percent changes of +3 and +12,
respectively.
The differences between FP and NFP hospitals across the three specialty market seg-
ments and the OTHER segment may stem from a variety of factors. Such factors may
include differential changes in market population composition; differential hospital char-
acteristics; differences in the density and capacity of ASCs; or differential propitious pa-
tient selection of ASCs. As profit-maximizers, FP HOPDs would have already selected
the most profitable patients, selected the most profitable procedures, and negotiated the
most profitable pricing with insurers prior to ASC entry. Thus, if NFP hospital objectives
did require them to service their communities to some extent (as opposed to focusing on
their bottom line), it follows that ASCs would seek to capture patients from FP hospitals
AHCA data listed only a single procedure code, the principal procedure code, with a small percentage of
claims listing more than one procedure. The number of procedures in the 90th percentile, for example, was 2.
National statistics corroborate this with approximately 60 percent of visits having only 1 procedure (Cullen
et al., 2009a) and secondary procedures aligning with diagnostics likely used for the principal (surgical)
procedure.
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more so than from NFP hospitals. Given the profit-maximizing nature of FP hospitals and
ASCs and the greater growth of single-specialty ASCs relative to multi-service ASCs,28
this difference may imply that ASCs prioritized capture of FP hospital patients and that
NFP hospitals have a less profitable patient mix to begin with, giving NFP hospitals more
ability to retain their volume. Figures 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 depict quarterly volume (logged)
of all procedures from private, government, and uninsured patients, and indicate that FP
hospitals experienced a larger decrease in privately-insured patients than NFP hospitals
over the study period, while NFP hospitals exhibited increases in surgical volume from
government-insured patients, and stable volume of uninsured patients.
Additionally, the differential expansion of the volume of OTHER procedures among
NFP hospitals relative to FP hospitals over this time period may be indicative of the adop-
tion of new outpatient procedures, as motivated in my conceptual model. Figure 2.4, de-
picting logged volume of the OTHER market of Table 2.2, shows stable average volume
among FP hospitals and decline then growth among NFP hospitals. The descriptives for
NFP hospitals do seem to corroborate an ability of NFPs to lose less, maintain, or even
surpass 2000 volume levels. Indeed, total patient volume across outpatient surgical mar-
kets demonstrated an 11 percent decrease for FP hospitals over the study period and an 8
percent increase for NFP hospitals.
Among ASCs, the number of visits across specialties increased by at least 41 percent
(EYE), while OTHER procedures increased by 31 percent from 2000 through 2009 (Table
2.3). These increases in outpatient surgical volume imply that some of the patients that
ASCs captured may have come from either unmet or induced demand in market segments,
28Over my study period, see Table 2.7.
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such that increases in ASC volume need not correspond to decreases in hospital volume.
Among markets known to be in competition (EYE, GS, NMK), the top 5 procedures in
surgical volume among HOPDs and ASCs were similar and captured 60 and 70 percent of
volume for HOPDs and ASCs, respectively (Table 2.4). As expected, NFP hospitals29 held
a larger share of the top 5 procedures.30 Table 2.5 shows the top 5 procedures in patient
volume in the OTHER category for FP and NFP hospitals and ASCs. Level 2 classifications
were similar between NFP and FP hospitals, though different in volume rank. The top
5 OTHER procedures (Level 1) differed between FP/NFP hospitals and ASCs, with the
exception of the integumentary (INTEG) CCS, for which Level 1 procedures were ranked
fifth among NFP hospitals, first among FP hospitals, and as three of the top 5 CCSs among
ASCs.
Table 2.2
Number of Surgical Operations In EYE, GS, NMK, and OTHER Markets in Florida
HOPDs (2000-2009; in 1,000s)
FP HOPDs NFP HOPDs All HOPDs
Year EYE GS NMK OTHER Total EYE GS NMK OTHER Total EYE GS NMK OTHER Total
2000 20 131 60 238 449 29 213 115 393 750 49 343 175 631 1199
2001 19 142 62 244 468 28 224 119 417 789 46 367 181 662 1256
2002 16 146 65 270 498 30 241 120 459 850 46 388 185 729 1348
2003 13 138 57 249 457 26 219 110 375 730 39 356 168 624 1187
2004 12 130 56 251 449 26 210 116 381 732 37 340 172 632 1181
2005 11 124 53 255 442 27 194 98 388 706 37 317 151 642 1148
2006 11 118 51 257 436 26 197 97 431 752 37 315 148 688 1188
2007 11 111 47 260 428 25 210 100 510 845 35 322 147 770 1273
2008 9 104 46 245 403 24 214 104 507 849 32 318 150 752 1252
2009 9 99 46 244 398 24 211 110 465 809 32 310 156 709 1208
10yr %chg -56% -24% -23% 3% -11% -19% -1% -5% 18% 8% -34% -10% -11% 12% 1%
Source: Florida state data, years 2000 - 2009.
Notes: Totals are the sums of EYE GS, NMK, and OTHER market segments for FP, NFP, and all NFP and FP hospitals combined. The 10 year percentage change is
calculated as the percent difference between year 2009 and 2000.
29NFP hospitals tend to be larger in their potential patient capacity; e.g., more beds, surgical operating
rooms.
30Examples: Level 1 Procedure 76 was 17.5 (NFP) of 27.7 (All HOPDs) percent; Level 1 Procedure 5
was 5.1 (NFP) of 7.9 (All HOPDs) percent.
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Table 2.3
Number of Surgical Operations In EYE, GS, NMK, and OTHER Markets in Florida
ASCs (2000-2009; in 1,000s)
Year EYE GS NMK OTHER
2000 250 261 171 157
2001 260 304 209 146
2002 277 361 229 154
2003 280 418 242 161
2004 293 465 267 170
2005 304 515 284 186
2006 309 577 310 196
2007 324 615 329 200
2008 336 641 330 201
2009 353 646 332 206
10yr %chg 41% 147% 94% 31%
Source: Florida state data, years 2000 - 2009.
Notes: Totals are the sums of EYE GS, NMK, and OTHER
market segments for all ASCs combined. The 10-year per-
centage change is calculated as the percent difference be-
tween year 2009 and 2000.
Table 2.4
Top 5 Level 1 CCS Surgical Procedures Among EYE, GS, NMK Specialty Markets
in Florida (2000-2009)
HOPDs ASCs
Level 2 (Market) Level 1 % of Specialty Markets Level 2 Market) Level 1 % of Specialty Markets
GS 76 27.7% GS 76 26.5%
GS 70 15.5% EYE 15 20.6%
NMK 5 7.9% NMK 5 10.4%
EYE 15 4.4% GS 70 10.0%
GS 85 3.7% NMK 151 2.1%
Source: Florida state data, years 2000 - 2009.




Top 5 Level 1 CCS Surgical Procedures in OTHER Market in Florida (2000-2009)
NFP HOPDs FP HOPDs ASCs
Level 2 Level 1 % of OTHER Market Level 2 Level 1 % of OTHER Market Level 2 Level 1 % of OTHER Market
Misc 231 8.97% INTEG 169 15.73% Urinary 100 9.26%
OBS 139 6.18% OBS 139 6.95% INTEG 175 8.17%
CVD 47 5.64% CVD 47 6.36% ETN 30 7.37%
CVD 54 5.49% CVD 54 5.61% INTEG 172 6.24%
INTEG 169 4.16% Misc 222 4.53% INTEG 170 5.83%
Source: Florida state data, years 2000 - 2009.
Notes CVD- cardiovascular system, OBS- obstetrics, INTEG - Integumentary system
(e.g., skin debridement), Misc - miscellaneous diagnostic and therapeutic procedures. Categories taken from the AHRQ’s CCS, procedure name cross-walk
available at https://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/toolssoftware/ccs/ccs.jsp.
2.2.3 Firm Description and Market Variation
There were 188 FP and NFP HOPDs in my sample period, 57 percent of which were
NFP hospitals, across 103 Florida HSAs. HOPDs were predominately hospital monopo-
lists31 in 70 of the 103 HSAs (68 percent) in my study. The split between NFP and FP
hospitals in these 70 HSAs with a singular hospital entity was virtually even, at 36 NFP
and 34 FP hospitals. The number of HOPDs in HSAs ranged from 1 to 13, with the average
number of HOPDs at 1.83, the median at 1, the 75th percentile at 2, and the 99th percentile
at 9 HOPDs. Over 90 percent of the 103 HOPDs had fewer than 3 hospitals. My primary
data set excludes hospitals that did not have complete data over the 10-year study period.32
ASCs were present in 79 percent of the 103 HSAs over the 10-year study period, in-
cluding ASCs present at the start of my study period (n=220 present at start of sample).
Eighty-six percent of HSAs with any ASC presence exhibited ASC entry during the study
period, indicating ASC entry in 68 percent of the 103 HSAs, or 211 ASC entries across 70
31In terms of general acute care hospital presence. This metric does not consider ASCs or hospitals such
as long-term care hospitals or rehabilitation hospitals that are not competitors to general acute care hospitals.
32Later results include these hospitals in a non-balance panel study with similar findings, indicating a
lack or minimal bias from this exclusion. The reason for lack of data on these hospitals is unknown (e.g.,
hospitals could have dropped from the sample due to merger or closure), as my data do not provide sufficient
information to discern exit reasons.
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HSAs. Table 2.6 shows the percentage of HSAs with any entry by ASC specialty. EYE
ASC entries were the least expansive across HSAs, impacting 36 percent of HSAs with
any entry, and GS ASC entries were the most expansive. Though ASCs often specialize
in operations for a singular body system, some ASCs may offer two or three specialties or
a specialty not included in the GS, NMK, or EYE CCS groupings. To account for multi-
specialty/service ASCs that may compete in a given surgical market, I classify ASCs that
provide a simple majority of operations in a CCS Level 2 category to be an ASC specializ-
ing in that particular CCS Level 2 category. ASCs not meeting the simple majority thresh-
old were classified as multi-specialty/service ASCs (MS).33 Across geographical markets,
GS and NMK ASCs exhibited the most growth, at increases of 108 and 124 percent, with
ASC growth across market segments exhibiting an 83 percent increase over the 10-year
period in Florida (Table 2.7). Almost 14 percent of ASCs present at any time during my
10-year study period exited the Florida market.
Table 2.6
HSAs With At Least 1 ASC Entry By Specialty (2000-2009, n=70)





Source: Florida state data, years 2000 - 2009, counting ASC en-
try that occurred after quarter 1 of 2000.
Notes: Categories taken from the AHRQ’s CCS, available at
https://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/toolssoftware/ccs/ccs.jsp.
33I also set this threshold to 75 percent with no discernible difference in classification.
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Table 2.7
ASCs Growth in Florida (2000-2009)
Year EYE GS NMK Multi-Specialty Total








2001 3 7 2 6 18
2002 3 8 6 4 21
2003 4 12 11 7 34
2004 4 9 3 8 24
2005 4 9 5 4 22
2006 3 6 7 6 22
2007 7 5 5 3 20
2008 4 4 6 7 21
2009 0 4 6 4 14
2009 Level Total 88 123 89 131 431
10yr %chg 57% 108% 134% 60% 83%
Source: Florida state data, years 2000 - 2009.
Notes: Categories taken from the AHRQ’s CCS, available at https://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/
toolssoftware/ccs/ccs.jsp. The 10 year percent changed is calculated as the percent difference
between year 2009 and 2000.
For the 155 HOPDs that were in the sample through the 10 year period, patient visit
volumes in the aggregate outpatient surgical market and across specialty markets were
higher for NP hospitals (Table 2.8). On average, markets with NFP hospitals had a slightly
greater average number of ASCs (by specialty). The socio-demographic market character-
istics of uninsured patient rate, unemployment rate, percentage of people in poverty, log
median income, and urban location were similar across markets with NFP and FP hospi-
tals. Population in 100,000s was larger in markets with FP hospitals, and FP hospitals were
more likely to be of medium or small size – as determined by a capacity measure of their
beds. As expected, and mirroring their larger surgical volume output, NFP hospitals had a
larger contingent of (unique) physicians across markets than FP hospitals (Table 2.9). In-
terestingly, FP hospitals exhibited a slightly lower average proportion of privately insured
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patients (40 percent) relative to NFP hospitals (47 percent) over the study period.34
34Trends over the study period (not shown) indicate a 40 percent decrease in privately insured patients




Summary Statistics by Profit Status, Mean (SD) Across Study Quarters (2000-2009)
FP NFP Total
Hospital Volume
All Volume 1426.1 2324.1 1930.2
(878.5) (1958.1) (1639.8)
EYE Volume 37.64 77.06 59.77
(70.42) (111.1) (97.36)
NMK Volume 173.5 322.6 257.2
(121.5) (296.7) (247.7)
GS Volume 395.1 622.8 522.9
(286.1) (509.6) (440.9)
OTHER Volume 819.8 1301.6 1090.2
(609.4) (1335.1) (1104.7)
# of Competing ASCs By Type
EYE ASC 1.138 1.320 1.240
(1.741) (1.475) (1.600)
NMK ASC 0.978 1.423 1.228
(1.411) (1.916) (1.727)
GS ASC 1.417 1.739 1.597
(1.685) (2.011) (1.882)
MS ASC 1.358 1.745 1.575
(1.502) (1.693) (1.623)
Market and Hospital Characteristics
Pct. Uninsured 20.21 19.48 19.80
(Market) (5.785) (5.583) (5.684)
Pct. Unemployed 5.341 5.213 5.269
(Market) (2.156) (2.109) (2.130)
Pct. Poverty, All Ages 12.92 12.74 12.82
(Market) (3.275) (3.113) (3.186)
Ln(Median Income) 9.929 9.945 9.938
(Market) (2.108) (2.107) (2.107)
Urban 0.897 0.908 0.903
(Market) (0.304) (0.289) (0.296)
Total Population/100k 8.692 7.882 8.237
(Market) (8.146) (6.564) (7.311)
Total Population/100k-Sq 141.9 105.2 121.3
(Market) (201.0) (158.6) (179.4)
Small 0.274 0.209 0.237
(Hospital) (0.446) (0.407) (0.426)
Medium 0.637 0.430 0.521
(Hospital) (0.481) (0.495) (0.500)
Observations 6200
Source: Florida state data, years 2000 - 2009. Other data sources include AHA Annual
Survey and U.S. Census data.
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Table 2.9




# Physicians EYE 2.605 5.288 4.111
(3.206) (5.985) (5.137)
# Physicians NMK 23.10 34.35 29.41
(12.84) (24.58) (21.04)
# Physicians GS 25.40 36.99 31.91
(13.92) (26.88) (22.88)
# Physicians OTHER 82.19 122.5 104.8
(50.02) (104.3) (87.16)
Hospital Patient Volume By Insurance Type Total
Government 745.3 1021.3 900.2
(452.6) (882.8) (738.9)
Private 575.5 1099.3 869.5
(440.4) (1059.7) (884.8)
Other 72.87 107.1 92.09
(84.84) (180.0) (147.1)
None 32.44 96.46 68.37
(38.09) (157.1) (124.5)
Observations 6200
Source: Florida state data, years 2000 - 2009.
Notes: Other insurer includes unidentified insurance types, Veterans Affairs, Tricare, and other
local/federal government insurers.
2.3 Empirical Strategy
I utilize a mixture of Horwitz and Nichols (2007)’s and Courtemanche and Plotzke
(2010)’s empirical strategies to inform my base model, Equation 2.3. My initial models
examine all outpatient surgeries combined, as these authors did. Following Bian and Mor-
risey (2007) and Courtemanche and Plotzke (2010), I use the log of hospital outpatient
surgical visits as my dependent variable, to provide a percentage style interpretation. I es-
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timate these models on a panel on private NFP and FP hospitals in Florida HSAs for the
duration of the study period.
ln(vallhq ) = β0 + β1ASC
any
mq + αh + γq + εhq (2.3)
My dependent variable is the log of outpatient surgeries (vallhq ) for hospital h in market
m at time q (year-quarter). The independent variable of interest in this model is ASCanymq ,
which accounts for the number of ASCs present in marketm at time q. αh accounts for hos-
pital fixed effects, and γq captures time fixed effects. This model and the models discussed
below treat ASC presence as exogenous. ASC market entry may be driven by observed
or unobserved factors. In a study of ASC diffusion, for example, Suskind et al. (2015)
found that ASC entry is most likely to occur in areas that are urban, have higher per capita
income, and have less existing competition for outpatient surgeries, as measured by HHI,
while latent need of outpatient surgery was not associated with ASC entry. Models dis-
cussed next incorporate controls for these observable characteristics and the end of this
section discusses analyses I conduct to account for various threats to identification of this
fixed-effects model.
Equation 2.4 adds to Equation 2.3 by incorporating a vector of time-varying hospi-
tal characteristics, Xhq, and market characteristics, Zmq. I limit hospital characteristics to
measures of capacity/size based on bed count, qualifying a hospital as small in a given
year if its bed count is at or below the 25th percentile of the distribution of the bed count
across all study hospitals, medium if its bed count is in the interquartile range, and large
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otherwise.35 I abstain from including other hospital-level identifiers such as patient mix,
as I am primarily concerned with the volume rather than the mix of patients treated, and
want to avoid confounding patient mix with ASC presence, given that ASCs may propi-
tiously select patients. Other potentially important hospital-level characteristics are time
invariant over the study period, such as a hospital’s teaching status. I include market char-
acteristics to account for underlying economic indicators and potential shifts in health care
demand, including the percentage of people uninsured, the unemployment rate, log of me-
dian income, total population in 100,000s, and its squared counterpart. Further, I include
specialty-specific measures of market concentration. Specifically, I calculate the HHIs for
the NMK, EYE, GS, and OTHER outpatient markets as the sum of squares of each hospi-
tal’s (and ASCs) share of total patient volume within a specialty in each period and HSA.
These HHI measures help account for effects of market concentration, (e.g., from mergers),
instead of allowing these potential effects to commingle with those of ownership, and are
introduced in model variants as lags at various horizons (e.g., 1 quarter or 1 year). Simi-
lar to Horwitz and Nichols (2007),36 I do not interact HHI measures by NFP status when
incorporating NFP status in later models.37
l(vallhq ) = β0 + β1ASC
any
mq + β2Xhq + β3Zmq + αh + γq + εhq (2.4)
35Most hospitals exhibit minor changes in bed count across study years, with few hospitals crossing per-
centile boundaries during the study period.
36Horwitz and Nichols (2007) cite Gaynor (2003) and Philipson (2006)’s evidence that hospitals show no
difference in exploiting market power and that both NFP and FP benefit from exploiting market power.
37As noted in Horwitz and Nichols (2007) and other studies, FP and NFP hospitals benefit equally from
exploiting market power. Additionally, as noted in later models, my work is principally concerned with
ownership status in relation to a particular competitor’s presence, ASCs, not market-wide concentration that
is stable in my study panel.
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Equation 2.5 extends Equation 2.4 by breaking out the impact of ASCs by specialty.




mq , and ASC
MS
mq .








mq + β5Xhq + β6Zmq + αh + γq + εhq (2.5)
The aforementioned models examine whether ASC presence, either in the aggregate or
by specialty, is associated with aggregate output changes in HOPDs. Equation 2.6 extends
these models to one of my principal hypotheses: namely, that the effects of ASCs are
market-dependent. The dependent variable is now surgical market-specific log of outpatient
volume of surgical market s, where s ⊂ (EY E,GS,NMK,OTHER) at hospital h and
time period q.








mq + β5Xhq + β6Zmq + αh + γq + ε
s
hq (2.6)
The second aspect of my hypothesis predicts that the relationship between ASC pres-
ence and hospital surgical volume within a given market segment is dependent on NFP
status. Equations 2.7 and 2.8 examine this second hypothesis by interacting NFP status
with ASC presence in Equations 2.3 and 2.4. NFP status, if included on its own, drops out
of earlier models, as it is collinear with hospital fixed effects. While NFP/FP status is time
invariant for the hospitals in my study over the study period,38 my hypothesis is that the
38In recent years, there have been news articles citing hospital conversions between these two ownership
statuses, but such conversion was not apparent in my data.
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effect of this ownership status is not invariant to ASC presence. Thus, Equations 2.7 and
2.8 are extensions that incorporate NFP status interactions in Equations 2.3 and 2.4. Given
the profit-maximizing nature of FP hospitals, I would expect to see a negative coefficient on
β1. However, given the varied theories of NFP firms, β2 holds potential for a negative, pos-
itive, or neutral effect where the linear combination of β1 and β2 determine NFP hospital
volume association with ASC presence holding all else equal. This ambiguity is furthered
by the potential for hospitals to expand to other lines of services, as noted in my conceptual
model, and requires examination of estimates across market segments.




mq ×NFPh + αh + γq + εhq (2.7)




mq ×NFPh + β3Xhq + β4Zmq + αh + γq + εhq (2.8)
I also include the NFP status interaction in a variant of Equation 2.6 expressed in Equa-
tion 2.9, where k ⊂ (EY E,GS,NMK,MS). In models that examine specific surgical
markets (e.g., Equations 2.6 and 2.9), I account for potential contemporaneous correlation
across outpatient surgical market types s by estimating each l(vshq) in a system of seem-
ingly unrelated equations (Zellner, 1962). This approach allows me to adjust inference
for contemporaneous correlation among outpatient surgical markets that may come from
cross-input (physician) utilization,39 or cross-market capital or operating materials such as
39A primary example: general surgeons that can perform a variety of surgeries versus specialty surgeons;
or, anesthesiologist.
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operating rooms or surgical equipment and materials.








mq ×NFPh + β1Xhq + β2Zmq + αh + γq + εshq (2.9)
In further analyses, I switch my dependent variable from outpatient volume(s) to the
number of unique HOPD physicians and volume by patient insurer type (i.e., private/commercial,
government, uninsured, or other). I examine these dependent variables in the aggregate
HOPD outpatient market and by outpatient specialty market. Examination of the num-
ber(s) of unique physicians providing surgical services in HOPDs may provide insight on
potential reallocation of inputs that would affect output. For example, a βi < 0 on ASCs
in market k might indicate (1) a reallocation of (general) surgeons to non-k markets not
in competition with ASCs, if accompanied with βj > 0 for such markets, or (2) shifts of
physicians to ASCs’ market k inputs. A βi > 0 for ASCs in market k would indicate a
positive relationship with HOPD inputs for that market. My data do not allow me to iden-
tify physician-hospital employment status; that is, whether a physician is employed with
the hospital or merely affiliated.40 Consequently, I cannot differentiate motives or causal
connections using my estimates. For example, assuming that affiliated physicians without
full employment contracts are more likely to work at ASCs and that ASCs had a presence
in market k, then a βi < 0 for market k and βj > 0 for a non-k market could be sug-
gestive of a type of voluntary or forced entry accommodation, with a forced mechanism
40Previous studies, detailed in Chapter 1, for example, have already established that ASC-physician own-
ership structure is associated with patient shifting to ASCs by physicians affiliated with those ASCs ( δRδS < 0,
in my model variant).
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stemming from a loss of physician inputs to ASCs and a voluntary mechanism stemming
from hospital reallocation of inputs and no change in overall (across market) inputs.
I also separate surgical volume by patient insurer type to provide insight into changes
that might differ by insurer-hospital relations; for example, strategies that might differ by
patient revenue. For example, my examination of the volume of uninsured patients may
provide evidence of existing NFP hospital theories, as a negative relationship between the
volume of surgical services to these patients and ASC presence may be indicative of output
maximizing strategies akin to those discussed in Horwitz and Nichols (2007).41 Conversely,
a positive relationship between NFP hospital volume among these patients and ASC pres-
ence may be suggestive of NFP hospitals behaving as community output-maximizers. An
increase in or recomposition of HOPD patient volume stemming from changes in patient-
insurer mix could be indicative of underlying population changes or hospital selection of
patients with insurers that provide higher reimbursements. If the former is the case, I
would expect to see no changes in models examining patient-insurer mix associated with
ASC presence, given time and population controls. If the latter, I would expect to see
revenue-maximizing NFP hospitals exhibit a stronger preference for patients with insurers
that provide higher reimbursements such as private/commercial insurers.42 I would not ex-
pect this latter scenario to occur among FP hospitals, as these hospitals would have already
selected profitable patients prior to ASC entry, unless their costs or constraints changed.
As noted in Section 2.1, an example of such a change might stem from technological in-
vestments that FP hospitals are known to make to decrease costs for treating patients. In
41E.g., NFP hospitals exhibited behavior similar to profit-maximizing among higher FP hospital density
areas, as a decreased likelihood of offering non-profitable services.
42Decreases in charity/uninsured patients might be indicative of cost-cutting motives in line with share
the pain, share the gain theories.
50
this example, FP hospitals may seek patients that were not previously profitable (in reality
or in expectation) in the face of their overall pool of profitable patients decreasing due to
ASC capture. For NFP hospitals, this type of scenario might better translate to such capture
occurring in new markets, as motived by Finkler (1983)’s model.
When combined with models examining NFP hospital volume, and in relation to ASC
presence, increases in HOPD volume with no disproportionate changes in patient-insurer
mix or decreases in least profitable patients (to maintain the zero-profit constraint) would
indicate output maximization; increases in volume among the least profitable patients to
support increasingly unserved patient pools would indicate community output maximiza-
tion; and, no changes in output, with increases in patients with insurers that provide higher
revenue, or the entering of new markets, would indicate revenue optimization. A mixture
of findings could indicate mixed objectives within an NFP hospital or across NFP hospitals.
Additional Empirical Considerations
It is natural to cluster standard errors at the hospital level in studies that examine hospi-
tal output43 to engender estimates robust to serial correlation, as hospital service provision
is likely dependent over time. However, given the heterogeneity of HSA markets, the ratio-
nale for using HSAs as a market definition and evidence pointing to the relevance of HSA
geographical characteristics in ASC entry (Suskind et al., 2015), I cluster standard errors
at the HSA-level. It may also be instructive to incorporate HSA-level fixed effects, given
my clustering rationale. However, the hospital fixed effects likely mitigate the need for
HSA fixed effects given the monopolist status of a sizable portion of hospitals in the study,
making the inclusion of HSA fixed effects collinear with hospital fixed effects.
43Or, other hospital-level changes for that matter.
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In other model variants, I further introduce MSA trends to account for the possibility
that markets may have exhibited differential growth rates. Ideally, I would include a full
set of HSAxTime interactions, but sample size concerns motivated my use of differing
linear trends for the 21 MSAs in the sample. This trend inclusion into my panel does not
account for non-linear growth across markets; however, it may account for unobserved
market characteristics favored by for-profit providers favor (Norton and Staiger, 1994). In
yet other model variants, I introduce NFP Status time trends to discern whether linear trends
specific to NFP or FP hospitals affect results. Inclusion of these terms restricts identification
to hospitals of the same FP/NFP status over time and control for time-varying hospital-
ownership trends that may otherwise bias results from my primary fixed-effect models.
While these model variants, in addition to controls, may mitigate or eliminate factors that
influence ASC presence and differential HOPD capacity to provide services, they do not
account for the potential of reverse causality, and this potential issue requires additional
analysis that I discuss in the exposition of my results (next).
2.4 Results
Does Hospital Surgical Market Provision Vary by the Presence of ASCs? Base mod-
els that account for ownership status through hospital fixed effects indicate that hospital
surgical market provision does not vary by the presence of various ASC specialties. Table
2.10 shows estimates for models detailed in Models 2.3 – 2.6. These models attempt to dis-
cern the relationship between ASC presence and aggregate HOPD outpatient volume and
whether this relationship differs across outpatient market segments and by ASC specializa-
tion. The results suggest at best a marginally statistically significant negative relationship
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between ASC presence and HOPD aggregate volume (Model 2.3), and this significance
disappears with the addition of market and hospital controls (Model 2.4). This result is
not surprising given the +1 percent change noted in aggregate HOPD volume in Florida
over my 2000-2009 study period (Table 2.2). Though not directly comparable, this lack of
change in the aggregate is similar to national-level studies such as Cullen et al. (2009b)’s
descriptive study, which found HOPD surgical volume to be largely unchanged from 1996
to 2006 or Courtemanche and Plotzke (2010)’s study, which estimated a modest 2 to 4
percent decrease in HOPD (nationwide) output from 1999 through 2004 after controlling
for hospital and market characteristics. Estimates of Models 2.5 and 2.6, an examination
of aggregate HOPD market volume and EYE, NMK, GS, and OTHER market segments in
relation to ASC presence by specialty, indicate no statistically significant relationships.
Does FP and NFP Hospital Surgical Volume Differ With ASC Presence? Table 2.11
shows estimates from variants of Models 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 that interact NFP status with any
ASC presence, and ASC presence by specialty. Results from Model 2.7 indicate a statis-
tically significant differential relationship between ASC presence and hospital ownership
on aggregate outpatient volume of +3.8 percent (NFPxASC; p<0.01) with a marginally
significant decrease of 3.3 percent among FP hospitals (p<0.1) and no statistically signifi-
cant change among NFP hospitals (+0.5 percent; p=0.66; ASC + NFPxASC). As with
my descriptive dissection of FP and NFP volume (Table 2.2), these results appear to iden-
tify differences between the responses of FP and NFP hospital volume to ASCs that are lost
when looking at the aggregate outpatient surgical market. Model 2.8 extends the NFP status
interaction across ASC specialties, and its estimates exhibit a significant NFP status differ-
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ential of +10.3 percent in relation to MS ASC presence, consisting of a 7.1 percent increase
in aggregate NFP hospital volume (p=0.023), with no statistically discernible change in ag-
gregate FP hospital volume. Next, I discuss hospital outpatient market segment-specific
estimates in Model 2.9 in the context of other facets of hospital competition.
Hospital Specialty Markets. Model 2.9 results are suggestive of a differential rela-
tionship by ownership status between EYE ASC presence and hospital EYE volume (43.3
percent; p<0.1), with a negative relationship in the EYE market among FP hospitals of
38.4 percent (p<0.05) and no statistically significant change among NFP hospitals (0.433
+ (-0.384)=0.049; p=0.70), all else equal. The presence of other ASCs did not exhibit
any statistically significant relationship with hospital EYE volume. Over the 10-year study
period, FP and NFP hospitals evidenced descriptive percent changes of -56 and -19, indi-
cating that market and other controls may have captured a negative trend in the EYE market
(Table 2.2). This narrative is potentially furthered by the fact that EYE ASCs exhibited the
lowest growth among ASC specialty facilities and second lowest (to multi-specialty ASC)
growth in volume. A decrease in volume among FP hospitals is not unexpected given my
earlier predictions, and the differentials in this model between NFP and FP volume suggest
the existence of different objectives between FP and NFP hospitals. Examination of unique
physician counts (inputs) confirm the differential impact of EYE ASC presence by owner-
ship. Table 2.15, estimates on the log of unique physicians and finds a statistically signifi-
cant difference between NFP and FP ownership in the relationship with EYE ASC presence
of +16.4 percent (p<0.05), with a decrease in unique physicians servicing FP hospitals’
EYE markets of 13 percent (p<0.05), and no statistically significant change in the count of
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unique physicians servicing NFP hospital EYE markets (ASCEY E +NFPxASCEY E).
Dissection of hospital surgical volume by insurer type aligns with my predictions on
ASC capture of FP and NFP hospital patients: namely, that an ASC will capture the most
profitable patients first and that, all else equal, FP hospitals would have already captured
the most profitable patients relative to NFP hospitals (pre-ASC). In the EYE market, EYE
ASC presence was negatively associated with FP hospitals’ volume from privately insured
patients (-33 percent, p<0.05; Table 2.13); there was a suggestive negative relationship
in patients insured by government (-39 percent, p<0.10; Table 2.12), and no change in
uninsured patients (Table 2.14). Among privately insured patients, NFP hospitals exhibited
no significant change in volume despite an NFPxASCEY E interaction estimate at +46.5
percent (p<0.01). This finding on volume from privately insured patients corresponds to
Section 2.2.3’s finding that study period trends indicated a 40-percent decrease in privately
insured patients across surgical markets from 2000 through 2009 among FP hospitals, while
NFP hospitals’ volume of this patient population appeared stable.
There were no discernible ownership differentials by ASC specialty presence in the
NMK HOPD market (Table 2.11). NMK ASC presence did, however, exhibit a statisti-
cally significant differential relationship with GS volume by ownership status (-22.7 per-
cent; p<0.01), with FP hospitals exhibiting a positive relationship in GS volume (+14
percent; p<0.05) and no change in GS volume among NFP hospitals (0.149+(-0.227)=-
0.08; p=0.17). The presence of GS ASCs was not related to GS volume of either hospital
type. These findings appear to stem from FP hospital increases in volume from private and
uninsured patients (Tables 2.13, 2.14). A potential explanation for this first association may
come from consideration of specialty procedure profitability. As noted earlier in this chap-
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ter, existing research coupled with the highest ASC growth over my study period occurring
in NMK and GS markets indicates a profitability ranking of NMK > GS > EY E. Thus,
it is possible that increased NMK ASC presence motivated FP hospitals to focus on the next
most profitable specialization. This re-optimization narrative is potentially furthered by a
statistically significant NFPxASCEY E differential that yields a 14.5 percent increase in
GS volume among NFP hospitals (p<0.05; ASCEY E + NFPxASCEY E). For NFP hos-
pitals, this re-optimization may be indicative of profit or revenue-maximizing behavior.
On its face, however, such re-optimization seems tenuous given (1) the results of Table
2.11, which show no statistically significant negative association between NMK ASCs and
NMK HOPD volume, (2) the lack of statistically significant changes in physicians in these
markets (Table 2.15), and (3) the ASC growth in this market, indicating that these mar-
kets exhibit strong competition. Market research for ASCs notes that the Medicare reim-
bursements has been and is likely to continue decreasing for ASCs and that private and
third-party insurers may follow suit (Tomcanin, 2010), implying that hospitals may see a
greater potential to compete against ASCs in the GS market given no decreases in their re-
imbursements. These decreases, however, were initiated at the tail end of my study period.
Further, given the lack of a negative relationship between FP hospital GS volume and GS
ASC presence (and no related changes in NFP GS volume), it seems more likely that GS
ASCs serviced unmet demand. The second noted association, the FP hospital increases in
surgical volume among uninsured patients, is puzzling given a lack of a clear motive for a
profit-maximizing hospital.
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Hospital OTHER Market. The presence of multi-specialty ASCs yielded differen-
tial responses between FP and NFP hospitals, with FP hospitals’ exhibiting a negative rela-
tionship (-10.7 percent, p<0.05) and NFP hospitals’ exhibiting a positive relationship (+8.2
percent, (0.189+(-0.107)=0.082; p=0.04). The lack of overlap among the top 5 procedure
classes in the catch-all/OTHER category of procedures between HOPDs and ASCs does
not necessarily mean that FP hospitals and ASCs do not directly compete in this category.
The overall small footprint of even the top 5 procedures in OTHER, however, makes it
difficult to determine the extent of competition (Table 2.5).44 Moreover, while the NFP
hospitals’ increase in OTHER volume is consistent with output maximization, it is difficult
to determine whether this increase resulted from reallocating threatened services to non-
threatened services, or a hypothesized revenue-maximizing behavior, such as the opening
of new markets. Models estimating whether changes in physician inputs are related to ASC
presence do suggest that the +8 percent relation exhibited by NFP hospitals was associated
with a 6 percent increase (p=0.03; Table 2.15) of physician inputs and increases in private
and government-insured patients of 9 percent (p=0.04) and 8 percent (p=0.04), respectively
(Tables 2.13 and 2.12).
Unlike other hospital specialty markets, the private and government patient insurer vol-
umes among NFP hospitals were not simply maintained but appeared to increase in rela-
tion to ASC presence (Tables 2.13, 2.14). The increases in these patient insurer populations
may align with the market mechanism that induced growth in the outpatient market to begin
44Descriptive analysis of insured populations in the OTHER market (Figures 2.5 and 2.6) indicate that
FP hospitals experienced a notable decrease in OTHER market volume among privately-insured patients,
while experiencing an increase in their government-insured population. This may be indicative of FP hos-
pitals attempting to capture patients under less threat of capture from ASCs or an unexpected focus on new
procedures.
57
with; namely, the adoption of new outpatient procedures transitioning from inpatient to out-
patient settings (MedPAC, 2010). Medicare is more likely to cover new procedures/settings
first, with private insurers following (Clemens and Gottlieb, 2013). The adoption of new
procedures/settings by private insurers would likely influence FP providers’ eventual adop-
tion. Until such adoption, however, NFP hospitals would be able to extract rents from
private and government-insured patients.
Taken together, these results indicate that FP hospitals and NFP hospitals do indeed
have different objective functions. Moreover, NFP hospitals did not appear to exhibit any
increases in volume of less profitable patients that one would not expect to be a priority
for ASCs – a lack of support for NFP hospitals acting as community output maximizers.
If ASCs are present in a given market, then NFP hospitals’ principal opportunity for rev-
enue or output maximization would come from new markets. Entering these new markets,
however, would require capital investment, which under revenue maximization, may en-
tail entering at a loss. Output maximization, in this context, would more readily manifest
as decreases in less profitable services or patients, which my estimates indicate does not
happen. Admittedly, such lack of decreases may have failed to manifest because any vol-
ume captured by ASCs may have been exhausted by patients captured from FP hospitals.
If, however, NFP hospitals did not experience such capture, then an output-maximizing
hospital would remain at its status-quo.
Threats to Identification. The results presented above are indicative of a differential
relationship between hospital ownership status and ASC presence that varies across out-
patient market segments. While the HSA market controls, hospital fixed effects, and time
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fixed effects I employ in my study should capture some time-invariant and time-varying
biases, the relationships I find are not causal. Threats to identification of these models
vary and include unobserved time-varying characteristics of the markets that may affect
changes in hospital output in a given outpatient surgical market segment as well as ASC
entry, which I assume to be exogenous. Additionally, there may exist trends among NFP
or FP hospitals not otherwise captured by ASC presence or hospital fixed effects.
As noted in the discussion of my empirical strategy, my models may have benefited
from the inclusion of HSA fixed effects and/or HSAxTime effects to further mitigate
omitted variable bias from unobserved market characteristics that may vary over time. Ad-
ditionally, interacting hospital fixed effects and time may further capture potential hospital
trends that would otherwise bias my results. With the limited hospital saturation in the ma-
jority of Florida HSAs, however, such controls are highly collinear with already included
hospital fixed-effects, making such approaches unsuitable. As an alternative, I introduce
MSAxTime effects in additional analyses presented in Appendix A to attempt to mitigate
omitted variable biases and account for potential differential market growth rates. The in-
clusion of these effects focuses identification in my models on variation among hospitals
within a given MSA. Estimates from Table 2.10 were not robust to MSA×Time effects;
however, the market and ownership breakout of models in Table 2.11 were generally quali-
tatively robust in significance (Table A.2). The differential sensitivity to underlying market
trends of models without ownership controls in Table 2.10 and the insensitivity of mod-
els with ownership interactions in Table 2.11 aligns with previous studies that indicate
FP hospital location choices differ from their NFP counterparts; namely, that FP hospitals
choose to locate in better-insured regions (Norton and Staiger, 1994). While the market
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characteristics I included (e.g., log median income, percentage of population in poverty)
do control for economic characteristics, the MSA×Time controls may have captured re-
lationships otherwise concomitant with ownership in my preliminary models that do not
account for the varying effect of ownership. The inclusion of these effects into my models
does not account for non-linear growth across markets nor does it account for time-varying
heterogeneity of hospitals within a given MSA.
In yet other model variants, I introduce NFP Status×TIME effects to discern whether
trends specific to NFP or FP ownership status affect results. Inclusion of these terms re-
stricts identification to hospitals of the same FP/NFP status over time and control for time-
varying hospital-ownership trends that may otherwise bias results from my primary fixed
effect models. Again, results are qualitatively similar to those presented above (Tables A.8
- A.13). As with the inclusion of MSA×Time effects, the inclusion of NFP Status×Time
effects would not account for non-linear trends such as S-curve diffusion of new procedures
that might, for example, appear first among NFP hospitals in markets favorable to the new
procedure(s) adopted. Indeed, to further the technological adoption narrative of the NFP
hospitals in the OTHER market, future work would need to model such non-linearities.
While these model variants, in addition to controls, may mitigate or eliminate factors
that influence ASCs’ presence and differential HOPD capacity to provide services, they do
not account for potential reverse causality. Reverse causality in my study of ASC-hospital
competition would stem, for example, from the profit-motives of physicians to open up
new ASCs as a result of hospital output observations. For example, physicians may have
noted excess demand in certain market segments that an ASC might capture or have been
incentivized by the financial aspects of ASC ownership and the expectation that they might
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funnel patients to their ASCs. The previously noted marked GS ASC growth over the study
period and lack of a relationship between contemporaneous GS ASC presence and hospital
output in the GS market may indeed be the result of such a phenomenon. Courtemanche
and Plotzke (2010)’s study of the relationship between aggregate hospital output and the
number of (any) ASC in a local geographic market (e.g., within 15 miles) attempts to dis-
cern whether their estimates of modest decreases in aggregate hospital outpatient volume
in relation to ASC presence are attributable to reverse causality through two approaches.
First, the authors incorporate lead ASC presence, one year out, noting that a significant
relationship on estimates of the lead term would constitute evidence of reverse causality.
Second, the authors use lagged ASC presence as an instrument for contemporaneous ASC
presence. The authors found no statistically significant relationship among various leads
of ASC presence and instrumenting ASC presence (with lags of 1 to 10 years) did not af-
fect their estimates but did indicate that the effect of ASCs on hospital volume may occur
quickly. In additional models, I incorporate ASC presence leads (by specialty) and note
that in examination of the GS hospital market, GS ASC leads at 2, 4, and 8 quarters are
statistically significant (p<0.01), with estimates that range from +11 to +15 percent, in-
dicating potential reverse causality. Further, contemporaneous GS ASC presence, initially
statistically insignificant in my primary model (Table 2.11), achieves statistical significance
(negative; p<0.05). Additionally, and interestingly, leads on MS ASC were also statisti-
cally significant in the GS hospital market - potentially indicating a general boost in MS
ASCs related to GS market potential. Given these estimates, an instrumental approach,
with a suitable instrument, would account for this threat to identification. However, Courte-
manche and Plotzke (2010)’s instrumentation approach does not appear plausible for the
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GS market given the underlying physician behavior that may impact both ASCs and hos-
pitals. Indeed, underlying physician motives make it difficult to identify an alternative
instrument. Medicare reimbursements for ASCs, for example, are observable, vary over
time, and differ from rates for hospitals, making them potential instruments (within a given
market) for ASC entry. Changes in these rates, however, may also impact hospital output
directly either through physicians that split their time between hospitals and ASCs or by
incentivizing physicians that leave their hospitals to work at ASCs.45 Additionally, as with
FP hospital location, for-profit ASC entry is likely also dependent on market characteristics
and trends that also affect hospital output.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
While standard theory would dictate that hospitals would exit the market in the face
of superior competitors, hospitals have continued to operate in the outpatient market, and
in some cases have exhibited expanding outpatient revenue over time. There are a few
factors that likely contribute to hospitals’ continued ability to compete with ASCs, and
examples include successful lobbying efforts to establish legislative restrictions on ASCs
and receiving higher revenue from insurers (reimbursement rates) relative to ASCs. These
interventions, however, may not last, as exemplified by recent legislation that proposes
to enforce site neutral payments, which would pay hospitals at substantially lower rates.
Hospital responses to ASCs that are in line with more typical quantity- or price-based
competitive strategies have not been examined. The exact mechanisms for competition
45A similar argument could be made for procedure coverage under ASCs, which typically lags coverage
at hospitals.
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under these avenues depend on a hospital’s maximizing objectives. For-profit hospitals are
assumed to be profit-maximizers. Not-for-profit hospitals, however, have no shortage of
theoretical models, with mixed empirical evidence to support them.
This dissertation expands on studies concerning hospital-ASC competition by separat-
ing the aggregate outpatient market into surgical procedure classifications, within estab-
lished market geographies for patients. Specifically, I examine three specialty outpatient
markets in which ASCs have exhibited substantial growth nationally and in the state of
Florida, from 2000 through 2009, in addition to examining a combined market of all other
outpatient surgical procedures. In this outpatient market dissection, I empirically exam-
ine how hospital patient volume, the number of physicians, and patient insurer mix vary
by ASC presence in a given market. My estimates suggest differential hospital ownership
status effects on hospital patient volume, hospital physicians, and highest revenue patients
(those privately insured) in select markets. Specifically, estimates indicate that for-profit
hospitals have lost a sizable amount of their privately/commercially insured patients in mar-
kets where they face ASC competition, while not-for-profit hospitals did not. My estimates
further indicate that not-for-profit hospitals are more likely to exhibit output expansion,
primarily among privately insured patients. Taken together, my results further the literature
on differential objectives of hospital ownership by examining emerging hospital markets
and indicating that in Florida, where the split between for-profit and not-for-profit private
hospitals is even, ASCs will focus on for-profit hospital populations first, and not-for-profit
hospitals can maximize output in a manner that prioritizes revenue.
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Table 2.10
Log of Patient Volume In Aggregate and By Specialty Market (2000 - 2009)
Model 2.3 Model 2.4 Model 2.6
ln(EYE Vol) ln(NMK Vol) ln(GS Vol) ln(OTHER Vol)
# of ASC -0.0223+ -0.00663
(-1.69) (-0.45)
EYE ASC -0.0937 -0.00324 0.0640 -0.0548
(-0.87) (-0.04) (0.87) (-1.01)
NMK ASC 0.00594 -0.0643 0.00590 -0.0419
(0.07) (-1.43) (0.10) (-1.45)
GS ASC -0.103 0.0520 -0.0356 -0.0179
(-1.35) (1.34) (-0.40) (-0.59)
MS ASC 0.00668 -0.00475 0.0307 0.00896
(0.09) (-0.16) (0.64) (0.26)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HOPD FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HSA Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6200 6200 6200
(1) + signifies p<0.1 ; * signifies p<0.05; ** signifies p<0.01; *** signifies p<0.001. T-statistics presented in parentheses.
(2) Standard errors for Models 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5 are robust and clustered at HSA. Model 2.6 estimated as seemingly unrelated
regression equations such that errors are allowed to correlate across equations; standard errors are also robust and clustered at
HSA.
(3) HSA controls include market-specific HHI, number of hospitals, proportion of uninsured population, proportion of popula-
tion in poverty, total population in 100k, total population in 100k squared; hospital-specific controls include small and medium
bed size indicators. Partial F-tests indicate predictive power of ASC variables, including their interactions, market controls,
time and hospital fixed effects, and hospital controls.
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Table 2.11
Log of Patient Volume In Aggregate and By Specialty Market And Ownership Status
(2000 - 2009)
Model 2.7 Model 2.8 Model 2.9
ln(All Vol) ln(All Vol) ln(EYE Vol) ln(NMK Vol) ln(GS Vol) ln(OTHER Vol)
# of ASC -0.0328+
(-1.72)
NFP × # of ASC 0.0379∗∗
(2.86)
EYE ASC -0.0971 -0.384∗ -0.104 -0.0792 -0.0523
(-1.59) (-2.36) (-1.31) (-0.83) (-0.94)
NMK ASC 0.0262 -0.00496 -0.0426 0.149∗ -0.0701
(0.48) (-0.04) (-0.65) (2.02) (-1.12)
GS ASC -0.0429 -0.174 0.0448 -0.0548 -0.0288
(-0.92) (-1.48) (0.99) (-0.55) (-0.73)
MS ASC -0.0323 -0.0368 -0.0359 -0.00335 -0.107∗
(-0.85) (-0.30) (-1.15) (-0.07) (-2.12)
NFP × EYE ASC 0.135+ 0.433+ 0.153 0.224∗ -0.000348
(1.84) (1.94) (1.60) (2.30) (-0.00)
NFP × NMK ASC -0.0636 -0.00540 -0.0396 -0.227∗ ∗ ∗ 0.0415
(-1.12) (-0.04) (-0.44) (-3.41) (0.50)
NFP × GS ASC 0.0421 0.100 0.0125 0.0367 0.0161
(1.17) (0.72) (0.22) (0.56) (0.33)
NFP ×MS ASC 0.103∗∗ 0.0836 0.0520 0.0521 0.189∗∗
(2.71) (0.53) (0.96) (1.17) (2.86)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HOPD FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HSA Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6200 6200 6200
(1) + signifies p<0.1 ; * signifies p<0.05; ** signifies p<0.01; *** signifies p<0.001. T-statistics presented in parentheses.
(2) Model 2.7 and 2.8 standard errors are robust and clustered at HSA. Model 2.9 estimated as seemingly unrelated regression equations
such that errors are allowed to correlate across equations; standard errors are also robust and clustered at HSA.
(3) HSA controls include market-specific HHI, number of hospitals, proportion of uninsured population, proportion of population in
poverty, total population in 100k, total population in 100k squared; hospital-specific controls include small and medium bed size
indicators. Partial F-tests indicate predictive power of ASC variables, including their interactions, market controls, time and hospital
fixed effects, and hospital controls.
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Table 2.12
Log Volume of Government Patients (2000 - 2009)
Model 2.8 Model 2.9
ln(All Vol) ln(EYE) ln(NMK) ln(GS) ln(OTHER)
EYE ASC -0.0141 -0.389+ -0.00725 -0.0224 0.0471
(-0.13) (-1.96) (-0.06) (-0.15) (0.44)
NMK ASC -0.0276 -0.0233 -0.0737 0.0848 -0.110
(-0.40) (-0.17) (-0.96) (1.01) (-1.41)
GS ASC -0.0680 -0.154 0.0234 -0.0339 -0.0710
(-1.36) (-1.17) (0.43) (-0.30) (-1.46)
MS ASC -0.0395 -0.0403 -0.0244 -0.0239 -0.120+
(-0.83) (-0.30) (-0.61) (-0.42) (-1.78)
NFP × EYE ASC 0.0101 0.414 0.0246 0.152 -0.138
(0.08) (1.57) (0.17) (0.98) (-1.01)
NFP × NMK ASC -0.0100 0.0275 -0.0351 -0.167+ 0.0673
(-0.13) (0.17) (-0.33) (-1.87) (0.66)
NFP × GS ASC 0.0732+ 0.0520 0.0514 0.0180 0.0676
(1.74) (0.34) (0.88) (0.22) (1.21)
NFP ×MS ASC 0.124∗∗ 0.0576 0.0805 0.0913+ 0.203∗∗
(2.76) (0.34) (1.21) (1.87) (2.65)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HOPD FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HSA Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6200 6200
(1) + signifies p<0.1 ; * signifies p<0.05; ** signifies p<0.01; *** signifies p<0.001. T-statistics
presented in parentheses.
(2) Model 2.8 standard errors are robust and clustered at HSA. Model 2.9 estimated as seemingly
unrelated regression equations such that errors are allowed to correlate across equations; standard
errors are also robust and clustered at HSA.
(3) HSA controls include market-specific HHI, number of hospitals, proportion of uninsured popula-
tion, proportion of population in poverty, total population in 100k, total population in 100k squared;
hospital-specific controls include small and medium bed size indicators. Partial F-tests indicate
predictive power of ASC variables, including their interactions, market controls, time and hospital
fixed effects, and hospital controls.
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Table 2.13
Log Volume of Private/Commercially Insured Patients (2000 - 2009)
Model 2.8 Model 2.9
ln(All Vol) ln(EYE) ln(NMK) ln(GS) ln(OTHER)
EYE ASC -0.182∗∗ -0.333∗∗ -0.160+ -0.135 -0.160∗ ∗ ∗
(-2.98) (-2.79) (-1.79) (-1.43) (-3.36)
NMK ASC 0.108+ 0.0139 0.00671 0.213∗ 0.0161
(1.72) (0.16) (0.09) (2.56) (0.26)
GS ASC -0.0185 -0.107 0.0553 -0.0493 0.0100
(-0.34) (-1.22) (1.05) (-0.48) (0.24)
MS ASC -0.0705 -0.0317 -0.0753+ -0.0507 -0.153∗∗
(-1.30) (-0.35) (-1.74) (-0.78) (-2.61)
NFP × EYE ASC 0.214∗∗ 0.465∗∗ 0.209∗ 0.246∗ 0.119
(2.69) (3.27) (1.98) (2.20) (1.52)
NFP × NMK ASC -0.161∗ -0.0820 -0.0760 -0.308∗ ∗ ∗ -0.0615
(-2.43) (-0.75) (-0.87) (-3.98) (-0.72)
NFP × GS ASC 0.0273 0.0584 0.00591 0.0373 -0.0204
(0.66) (0.53) (0.09) (0.50) (-0.44)
NFP ×MS ASC 0.148∗ 0.0790 0.0805 0.0999+ 0.245∗∗
(2.36) (0.70) (1.39) (1.69) (3.14)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HOPD FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HSA Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6200 6200
(1) + signifies p<0.1 ; * signifies p<0.05; ** signifies p<0.01; *** signifies p<0.001. T-statistics
presented in parentheses.
(2) Model 2.8 standard errors are robust and clustered at HSA. Model 2.9 estimated as seemingly
unrelated regression equations such that errors are allowed to correlate across equations; standard
errors are also robust and clustered at HSA.
(3) HSA controls include market-specific HHI, number of hospitals, proportion of uninsured popula-
tion, proportion of population in poverty, total population in 100k, total population in 100k squared;
hospital-specific controls include small and medium bed size indicators. Partial F-tests indicate
predictive power of ASC variables, including their interactions, market controls, time and hospital
fixed effects, and hospital controls.
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Table 2.14
Log Volume of Uninsured Patients (2000 - 2009)
Model 2.8 Model 2.9
ln(All Vol) ln(EYE) ln(NMK) ln(GS) ln(OTHER)
EYE ASC 0.0863 -0.0262 -0.00740 -0.0246 0.152
(0.82) (-0.33) (-0.05) (-0.19) (1.23)
NMK ASC -0.0893 -0.117∗ -0.0220 0.179∗ -0.179
(-1.14) (-2.14) (-0.30) (2.52) (-1.60)
GS ASC -0.0782 -0.0805+ -0.0369 -0.0197 -0.0846
(-0.93) (-1.66) (-0.38) (-0.18) (-0.94)
MS ASC -0.116+ -0.132∗∗ -0.0276 -0.0166 -0.209∗
(-1.90) (-2.87) (-0.81) (-0.30) (-2.03)
NFP × EYE ASC 0.0229 0.0469 0.0364 0.176 -0.0682
(0.16) (0.53) (0.23) (1.35) (-0.40)
NFP × NMK ASC 0.100 0.115 0.0485 -0.142 0.164
(0.84) (1.48) (0.52) (-1.62) (0.96)
NFP × GS ASC 0.0465 0.0488 0.0677 0.00174 0.0581
(0.47) (0.90) (0.62) (0.02) (0.51)
NFP ×MS ASC 0.111 0.0262 -0.0410 -0.0268 0.206
(1.14) (0.42) (-0.80) (-0.46) (1.43)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HOPD FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HSA Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6200 6200
(1) + signifies p<0.1 ; * signifies p<0.05; ** signifies p<0.01; *** signifies p<0.001. T-statistics
presented in parentheses.
(2) Model 2.8 standard errors are robust and clustered at HSA. Model 2.9 estimated as seemingly
unrelated regression equations such that errors are allowed to correlate across equations; standard
errors are also robust and clustered at HSA.
(3) HSA controls include market-specific HHI, number of hospitals, proportion of uninsured popula-
tion, proportion of population in poverty, total population in 100k, total population in 100k squared;
hospital-specific controls include small and medium bed size indicators. Partial F-tests indicate pre-
dictive power of ASC variables, including their interactions, market controls, time and hospital fixed
effects, and hospital controls.
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Table 2.15
Log of Unique Physician Counts (2000 - 2009)
Model 2.8 Model 2.9
ln(All Vol) ln(EYE) ln(NMK) ln(GS) ln(OTHER)
EYE ASC -0.0808∗∗ -0.129∗ -0.0359 -0.0380 -0.0924∗∗
(-2.97) (-2.35) (-1.27) (-0.94) (-2.68)
NMK ASC 0.0465 0.00381 0.00901 0.0215 0.0241
(1.20) (0.09) (0.27) (0.59) (0.64)
GS ASC -0.0261 -0.0346 -0.0272 0.0139 -0.0164
(-0.99) (-0.84) (-1.45) (0.41) (-0.68)
MS ASC -0.0645∗ -0.0748+ -0.0335 -0.0422 -0.0909∗∗
(-2.53) (-1.83) (-1.37) (-1.58) (-3.13)
NFP × EYE ASC 0.0659 0.164∗ 0.00104 0.0754+ 0.0718
(1.24) (2.56) (0.02) (1.66) (1.18)
NFP × NMK ASC -0.0229 -0.00516 0.0203 -0.00852 -0.0204
(-0.42) (-0.10) (0.41) (-0.19) (-0.36)
NFP × GS ASC 0.000233 0.0366 0.0285 -0.0259 0.00307
(0.01) (0.80) (0.90) (-0.85) (0.09)
NFP ×MS ASC 0.114∗ ∗ ∗ 0.113∗ 0.0474 0.0308 0.146∗ ∗ ∗
(3.72) (2.14) (1.60) (1.14) (3.87)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HOPD FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HSA Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6200 6200
(1) + signifies p<0.1 ; * signifies p<0.05; ** signifies p<0.01; *** signifies p<0.001. T-statistics
presented in parentheses.
(2) Model 2.8 standard errors are robust and clustered at HSA. Model 2.9 estimated as seemingly
unrelated regression equations such that errors are allowed to correlate across equations; standard
errors are also robust and clustered at HSA.
(3) HSA controls include market-specific HHI, number of hospitals, proportion of uninsured popula-
tion, proportion of population in poverty, total population in 100k, total population in 100k squared;
hospital-specific controls include small and medium bed size indicators. Partial F-tests indicate pre-
dictive power of ASC variables, including their interactions, market controls, time and hospital fixed
effects, and hospital controls.
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Table 2.16
Charlson Comorbidity Index (2000 - 2009)
Model 2.8 Model 2.9
(1) (2)
All Volume EYE NMK GS OTHER
EYE ASC 0.0158 0.0247 0.0106 0.00968 0.00359
(0.71) (0.84) (1.00) (0.60) (0.12)
NMK ASC -0.00657 -0.0159 -0.00445 -0.0108 0.0160
(-0.60) (-0.61) (-0.54) (-1.07) (1.15)
GS ASC -0.00131 -0.0285 -0.0127 0.00687 -0.00269
(-0.09) (-1.89) (-1.95) (0.57) (-0.18)
MS ASC -0.00288 0.0217 0.00934 -0.00418 0.0160
(-0.42) (1.39) (1.68) (-0.66) (1.29)
NFP × EYE ASC -0.0433 -0.0314 -0.0496∗∗ -0.0397∗ -0.0194
(-1.75) (-0.99) (-3.25) (-2.14) (-0.64)
NFP × NMK ASC 0.0170 0.0203 0.0165 0.0259∗ -0.0120
(0.95) (0.72) (1.56) (2.26) (-0.54)
NFP × GS ASC -0.00845 0.00172 0.00661 -0.00551 -0.0103
(-0.53) (0.11) (0.83) (-0.49) (-0.52)
NFP ×MS ASC -0.0109 -0.0184 -0.0185 -0.00800 -0.0358∗∗
(-0.84) (-1.05) (-1.50) (-0.70) (-2.84)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HOPD FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HSA Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6200 6200
(1) + signifies p<0.1 ; * signifies p<0.05; ** signifies p<0.01; *** signifies p<0.001. T-statistics
presented in parentheses.
(2) Model 2.8 standard errors are robust and clustered at HSA. Model 2.9 estimated as seemingly
unrelated regression equations such that errors are allowed to correlate across equations; standard
errors are also robust and clustered at HSA.
(3) HSA controls include market-specific HHI, number of hospitals, proportion of uninsured pop-
ulation, proportion of population in poverty, total population in 100k, total population in 100k
squared; hospital-specific controls include small and medium bed size indicators. Partial F-tests
indicate predictive power of ASC variables, including their interactions, market controls, time
and hospital fixed effects, and hospital controls.
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Notes: Data from Florida state from 2000 through 2009 on the log of outpatient surgical
volume from privately insured patients serviced at for-profit (FP) or not-for-profit (NP) hos-
pitals.
Figure 2.1
Average Log(Private-Insured Patient Volume) by Ownership Status (2000 - 2009)
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Notes: Data from Florida state from 2000 through 2009 on the log of outpatient surgical
volume from government (Medicare/Medicaid) insured patients serviced at for-profit (FP)
or not-for-profit (NP) hospitals.
Figure 2.2
Average Log(Government-Insured Patient Volume) by Ownership Status (2000 -
2009)
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Notes: Data from Florida state from 2000 through 2009 on the log of outpatient surgical
volume from uninsured patients serviced at for-profit (FP) or not-for-profit (NP) hospitals.
Figure 2.3
Average Log(Uninsured Patient Volume) by Ownership Status (2000 - 2009)
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Notes: Data from Florida state from 2000 through 2009 on the log of total outpatient surgical
volume in OTHER market provisioned by for-profit (FP) or not-for-profit (NP) hospitals.
Figure 2.4
Average Log(OTHER Patient Volume) by Ownership Status (2000 - 2009)
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Notes: Data from Florida state from 2000 through 2009 on the log of total outpatient
surgical volume in OTHER market from privately insured patients serviced by for-profit
(FP) or not-for-profit (NP) hospitals.
Figure 2.5
Average Log(Private-Insured Patient Volume) in OTHER Market by Ownership
Status (2000 - 2009)
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Notes: Data from Florida state from 2000 through 2009 on the log of total outpatient surgical
volume in OTHER market from government (Medicare/Medicaid) insured patients serviced
by for-profit (FP) or not-for-profit (NP) hospitals.
Figure 2.6
Average Log(Government-Insured Patient Volume) in OTHER Market by
Ownership Status (2000 - 2009)
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Chapter 3: The Direct and Indirect Costs to Society of Treatment for
End-Stage Knee Osteoarthritis
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The past two decades have seen growth in the number of total knee arthroplasties per-
formed in the U.S. A recent study shows that the number of primary total knee arthro-
plasties performed in fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries increased 162% from 1991 to
2010 (Cram et al., 2012). In 2010, over 600,000 total knee arthroplasty procedures were
performed across all age groups in the U.S. (Cram et al., 2012). With an aging population,
demand for total knee arthroplasty in the U.S. will continue to rise, with the total number
of procedures expected to exceed three million by the year 2030 (Kurtz et al., 2009).
The growing utilization of total knee arthroplasty is a reflection of several factors. The
procedure is safe and effective, improving the quality of life for individuals with severe
osteoarthritis of the knee (Losina et al., 2009; Hawker et al., 2009). The aging of the
population and the increase in obesity contribute to a higher prevalence of osteoarthritis
and a greater need for total knee arthroplasty, although these factors alone cannot account
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for the high growth in the procedure (Losina et al., 2012). The most rapid increases in total
knee arthroplasty in the U.S. are occurring in the working-age population; from 1997 to
2010, the percentage of all total knee arthroplasty that were performed in adults forty-five
to sixty-four years of age increased substantially from 26% to 42% (AHQR, 2012).
Studies have shown total knee arthroplasty to be a cost-effective procedure, with an
incremental cost of $18,300 per quality-adjusted life year (QALY) for individuals in the
Medicare program, including high-risk individuals (Losina et al., 2009). Although a few
studies have examined the economic burden of osteoarthritis, we are not aware of any stud-
ies that have examined the impact of total knee arthroplasty from a societal perspective
(daCosta DiBonaventura et al., 2011; daCosta DiBonaventura et al., 2012; Yelin et al.,
2004). Existing, but limited, literature supports a link between total knee arthroplasty for
osteoarthritis and workforce participation, with the latter being a major component of soci-
etal costs.1 However, this literature is based on small observational studies, and the strength
of this link between total knee arthroplasty and work status is not well established (Lyall
et al., 2009). We hypothesized that the economic effects of total knee arthroplasty may be
substantial, particularly given the growth in knee replacement among individuals of work-
ing age and the trend among working adults to choose to delay retirement (Toossi, 2012).
The purpose of this study was to estimate the value of total knee arthroplasty from a
societal perspective by estimating its costs and benefits to patients, employers, payers, and
government in the U.S. We used a Markov model framework with three primary compo-
nents: (1) quality of life; (2) direct medical costs for the total knee arthroplasty, compli-
1Sayre et al., 2010; Jones et al., 2003; Jones et al., 2001;Hootman and Helmick, 2006; Dionne et al.,
1999; Fautrel et al., 2005’ Gupta et al., 2005; Bieleman et al., 2011; Lyall et al., 2009; Norman-Taylor et al.,
1996; Desmeules et al., 2010; Jorn et al., 1999; Lerner et al., 2002; Palmer, 2012; Palmer et al., 2005
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cations of surgery, and revision arthroplasty; and (3) indirect costs involving employment
status, earnings, time missed from work (or absenteeism), and disability payments.
3.1 Data and Methods
3.1.1 Modeling Approach
We developed a Markov cohort model for patients with end-stage osteoarthritis of the
knee to assess the incremental costs and outcomes of total knee arthroplasty compared
with nonsurgical treatment. This approach considers the timing and probability of different
patient outcomes. The Markov model calculates the present-day value of the expected
(direct and indirect) costs and QALYs gained over the lifetime of a cohort of patients for
each treatment strategy, with future costs and benefits discounted at a rate of 3% per year
(West et al., 2003).
Model results were generated for the population forty years of age or older who re-
ceived a total knee arthroplasty in the U.S. in 2009. This group accounted for 99% of all
total knee arthroplasties performed in that year. For each age and treatment strategy, the
direct cost, quality-of-life (termed utility), and disability payment components of the mod-
els were calculated until the age of ninety-nine years or mortality. Household income and
missed workdays (accounting for age and sex-specific differences in income and workforce
participation) were calculated until the age of seventy-five years, at which point workers
were assumed to retire. An age-weighted mean of the model findings was obtained with use
of the age distribution of patients undergoing total knee arthroplasty in 2009. The model
operated on a one-year cycle.
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The principal objective of the study was to determine the societal savings from total
knee arthroplasty, measured as the difference between the total costs associated with sur-
gical and nonsurgical treatment. Five outcomes were calculated in the model: (1) QALYs,
which are the accumulation of years of life weighted by an indicator of quality ranging
from 0 for death to 1 for a year in perfect health; (2) lifetime direct medical costs; (3)
indirect cost components involving expected income (the product of income for a worker
and the probability of working); (4) the value of missed days of work; and (5) expected
disability payments (the product of mean disability payments and the probability of receiv-
ing Supplemental Security Income [SSI] because of a disability). These components were
projected over the lifetime of individuals.
3.1.2 Markov Model
The structure of the Markov model and the assumed utilities (quality-of-life measures)
and transition probabilities are derived from Losina et al. (2009). In accordance with that
study, ten health states were included (Figure 3.1) Two of these states are surgical (primary
and revision total knee arthroplasty). An individual could not be in a particular surgery-
related health state for more than one consecutive year at a time, whereas the remaining
states were potentially chronic (e.g., a patient could stay in the full-benefit total knee arthro-
plasty state until death). After being in any state for one year, an individual was permitted
to either transition to a chronic state or, if already in a chronic state, stay in his or her current
state. Once in the primary or revision total knee arthroplasty surgical state, an individual
was required to transition to the limited-benefit state, the full-benefit state, or an early failed
total knee arthroplasty state after one year.
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Transitions to either chronic state are dependent on WOMAC (Western Ontario and
McMaster Universities Osteoarthritis Index) thresholds, normalized to a maximum possible
score of 100 points, provided in Losina et al. (2009). Specifically, an individual with a
postoperative WOMAC score of >60 points transitions to the full-benefit postoperative
state, whereas an individual with a WOMAC score of≤ 60 points transitions to the limited-
benefit postoperative health state. Individual patients may stay in these health states for the
remainder of their life or have a failure in the knee prosthesis and transition to the failed
total knee arthroplasty health state. Once in the failed state, individuals may remain in that
state or choose to undergo a revision total knee arthroplasty and transition to the revision
total knee arthroplasty state. After this revision state, individuals will transition to either
the post-revision full-benefit state or the post-revision limited-benefit state, where they may
remain until they transition to either the failed revision total knee arthroplasty state or death.
Death is an absorbing state that could occur at any point, with a natural mortality prob-
ability based on sex and age data from U.S. Census Bureau life expectancy tables (Bureau,
2012) (or with a combined natural mortality probability and surgical mortality probability
if transitioning from a surgical state).
3.1.3 Direct Cost Estimates
The direct medical costs of surgical treatment were calculated with use of 2009 Medi-
care inpatient claims for a 5% sample of beneficiaries. The ICD-9 (International Classi-
fication of Diseases, Ninth Revision) diagnosis code 715.x6 was used to identify patients
admitted to a hospital with a primary diagnosis of osteoarthritis of the knee. The ICD-
9 procedure code 81.54 was used to identify treatment with total knee arthroplasty, and
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81.55, 00.80, 00.81, 00.82, 00.83, and 00.84 were used to identify revision knee arthro-
plasty. The direct model costs included Medicare payments for inpatient care, physician
services, and care provided in post-acute care facilities, such as skilled nursing facilities,
hospice, home health care, inpatient rehabilitation facilities, and long-term care hospitals
(Table 3.1). These costs were tracked for three months after surgery, as our panel of clin-
ical experts estimated that the expenses that accrued in this time period were most likely
attributable to the arthroplasty surgery. Additionally, we estimated the mean cost of physi-
cal therapy visits over this time period to be $2,016 (net present value in 2009 U.S. dollars)
and included it as part of the rehabilitation costs associated with primary or revision total
knee arthroplasty. Because payer and patient costs were derived with use of Medicare pay-
ments, we applied an adjustment to the direct costs estimated under Medicare to account
for non-Medicare payments for persons younger than sixty-five years (see Appendix B).
The costs of perioperative complications ($17,514 per year) and endstage osteoarthritis
($5,282 per year) for the Medicare population were obtained from Losina et al. (2009),
adjusted for an all-payer population, and converted to 2009 dollars. Costs accrued within
one year of primary and revision total knee arthroplasty were calculated as the cost of the
relevant procedure plus the equally weighted expected cost of experiencing the limited-
benefit or full-benefit state.
3.1.4 Indirect Cost Estimates
The effects of knee osteoarthritis on indirect costs were estimated with use of methods
and data from the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) reported by Dall et al. regard-
ing functional limitations, employment, missed workdays, income, and disability payments
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(Dall et al., 2013). These findings allowed us to predict an individuals probability of being
employed, number of missed workdays (if working), household earnings (if working), and
probability of receiving SSI disability payments conditional on his or her level of functional
ability in a given year (see Appendix B).
Predicted values for indirect cost components were obtained by utilizing patient-reported
data on pre-surgery and post-surgery functional status collected by a large orthopaedic
group practice. Electronic questionnaires were sent to 310 patients who received a total
knee arthroplasty from September 2010 to April 2011. A total of seventy-three responses
were received and used in the analyses. The survey contained questions regarding an in-
dividuals socioeconomic status and functional ability (using the questions on functional
status from the NHIS) prior to obtaining surgery and after receiving surgery. Functional
questions included the following possible answers: no difficulty, only a little difficult,
somewhat difficult, very difficult, and cannot do. Numerical values of 1 through 5 were
assigned to the responses, with no difficulty assigned a value of 1 and cannot do assigned a
value of 5.
Patients were categorized as receiving full benefit from the total knee arthroplasty if
their mean post-surgery response averaged over all functional questions was≤ 3 (somewhat
difficult) and as receiving limited benefit otherwise. Assuming this response categorization
allowed us to match the distribution of patients experiencing full benefit from total knee
arthroplasty (88%) in the study by Losina et al. (2009) (Table 3.2).
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3.2 Results
Relative to nonsurgical treatment, the mean lifetime net societal savings per patient
resulting from total knee arthroplasty was $18,930 (Table 3.3). Each knee arthroplasty
increased lifetime direct costs by a mean of $20,635, while the societal savings in lower
indirect costs from improved functional status averaged $39,565. Eighty-five percent of
these savings originated from increased income, through a combination of increased prob-
ability of working and higher earnings. The remaining 15% of societal savings resulted
from fewer missed workdays and lower disability payments. Although our results showed
net societal savings from total knee arthroplasty in the full cohort of patients, direct med-
ical costs from total knee arthroplasty began to exceed societal savings at a patient age of
seventy years at the time of the index procedure, indicating a crossover from positive net
societal savings from total knee arthroplasty procedures to negative net societal savings.
The youngest patients receiving a total knee arthroplasty predictably accrued substan-
tially higher lifetime savings associated with surgery because they accrued benefits over
more years than elderly patients. The difference in societal savings between the oldest age
group (80 years) and youngest group (forty to forty-four years) was $174,364 over a life-
time (Table 3.3). The only savings accrued for retired patients involved lower disability
benefits, which were relatively small compared with earnings. For patients younger than
sixty years, the net increase in societal savings resulting from surgery ranged from $85,263
(fifty-five to fifty-nine years old) to $177,342 (forty to forty-four years old).
The difference in total direct medical costs between surgical and nonsurgical treatment
increased with age. For patients in the forty to forty-four-year age group, the lifetime direct
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medical costs of surgery were $19,232 greater than the direct medical costs of nonsurgical
treatment (Table 3.4). For patients eighty years of age or older, the difference in lifetime
direct medical costs was $22,339. The higher incremental cost of surgery compared with
nonsurgical treatment for older patients is driven by the assumption that post-surgery med-
ical spending for patients who undergo total knee arthroplasty is less than that for patients
treated nonoperatively. Younger patients are able to accrue savings from lower medical
spending after total knee arthroplasty over a longer time period compared with older pa-
tients. Although the savings from lower medical costs after total knee arthroplasty do not
fully offset the cost of the procedure, they reduce the difference in direct medical costs
between the surgical and nonsurgical treatment options.
Our model demonstrated large QALY increases from total knee arthroplasty as a re-
sult of higher quality of life for patients treated surgically compared with nonsurgically.
For patients from forty to forty-four years of age, surgery resulted in an increase of 3.4
QALYs. The principal outcome calculated was the incremental cost effectiveness ratio
(ICER), which is the ratio of the cost difference between the treatment options and the
corresponding QALY difference. Considering only direct costs, this implies an ICER of
$5,656 for total knee arthroplasty in the entire cohort. In comparison, the improvement for
those eighty years old or older was 1.8 QALYs, with an ICER of $12,410. Thus, our model
demonstrates that total knee arthroplasty was cost effective across all age groups, assuming
a willingness-to-pay threshold of $50,000 per QALY gained.
We performed a one-way sensitivity analysis on our assumptions regarding direct costs,
utility measures, and relevant transition probabilities (Figure 3.2). In this analysis, the cost
effectiveness in cohorts ranging from forty to ninety-nine years of age was recalculated as
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the assumed value of each single parameter was varied. The net societal savings reported
in Table 3.5 are mean (age-weighted) values across all age groups. The sensitivity analysis
indicated that the QALY changes resulting from surgery were robust to the investigated
level of variation in the utility for the full-benefit state. Net societal savings remained pos-
itive with variations in the transition probabilities and the costs associated with end-stage
osteoarthritis of the knee, primary and revision total knee arthroplasty, and perioperative
complications.
We found little variation in net societal savings from variations in disability payments
and in expected missed workdays. The results were more sensitive to changes in expected
income increases from the full-benefit state. When the simulated expected income was
decreased by 25%, the positive net savings dropped from $18,930 to $9,762.
3.3 Discussion
Primary and revision total knee arthroplasty involving a wide array of methods and
prostheses are cost-effective (Burns et al., 2006; Novak et al., 2007; Rissanen et al., 1997;
Lavernia et al., 1997; and Katz et al., 2004). However, to our knowledge the present study
is the first to focus on the societal value of total knee arthroplasty, taking into account a
broad array of economic outcomes, for the full cohort of patients receiving this procedure.
We confirmed that total knee arthroplasty is a cost-effective intervention for individuals
with end-stage osteoarthritis of the knee. Furthermore, we demonstrated positive net soci-
etal savings for patients younger than seventy years of age at the time of surgery, and we
demonstrated an age-weighted positive net benefit of $18,930 over all ages.
Our analysis expands on the analysis of Losina et al. (2009) in four important ways.
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First, we updated and expanded the direct medical costs associated with total knee arthro-
plasty by conducting an analysis of 2009 Medicare claims. Second, we estimated the cost-
effectiveness of total knee arthroplasty for the full cohort of patients receiving the procedure
in 2009, including the growing segment of working-age individuals receiving knee replace-
ment surgery. Third, we adjusted reimbursement levels for an all-payer population. Fourth,
we incorporated indirect costs related to employment, earnings, and disability payments
into the model to generate findings from a societal perspective.
The calculated ICER for individuals sixty-five years of age or older differs from the
$18,300 reported previously by Losina et al. (2009). The difference in direct medical costs
for total knee arthroplasty between our study (ranging from $20,523 for the sixty-five to
sixty-nine-year age cohort to $22,339 for the eighty year-and-older cohort) and that of
Losina et al. (2009) ($20,800) was small. The key factor leading to our lower (better)
calculated ICER is the greater estimated QALY increase from surgery in the present study
(ranging from 2.4 additional QALYs for the sixty five to sixty-nine-year age cohort to 1.8
additional QALYs for the eighty-year-and-older cohort) compared with the study by Losina
et al. (2009) (1.4 additional QALYs for the Medicare population). The QALY difference
may be due to our assignment of higher utility values in the primary and revision total
knee arthroplasty health states. Specifically, we assigned a mean utility value based on
pre-surgery and post-surgery utility values.
This study has several limitations that are worth noting and represent areas for fu-
ture research. First, we applied the same utility assumptions for all patients reaching the
full-benefit health state as well as for all patients reaching the limited-benefit health state.
These utility levels were obtained from the study by Losina et al. (2009), which is based
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on Medicare-age patients receiving total knee arthroplasty and may therefore understate
the initial benefits received by a younger population that experiences better recuperation.
Second, patient outcome data were obtained retrospectively from patients up to two years
following total knee arthroplasty, introducing the possibility of recall bias regarding func-
tional limitations prior to surgery. However, the functional scores reported in our survey
are comparable with those in the existing literature (see Appendix B; Hawker et al., 2009;
Jones et al., 2001; Lingard et al., 2001). Third, we inferred the effects of total knee arthro-
plasty on indirect costs by linking osteoarthritis of the knee, functional limitations, and
economic outcomes (e.g., employment). This was done because of the lack of published
evidence. Fourth, our estimates of net societal savings from knee replacement are based
on mean indirect cost reductions for individuals who undergo the procedure. However, not
all of these individuals will have had equal osteoarthritis severity, as suggested by large
geographic variations in the total knee arthroplasty rate (Fisher et al., 2014; for the Eval-
uative Clinical Services, 2007). Thus, careful consideration of individual patient needs
and alternatives to total knee arthroplasty may further increase the estimated value of the
procedure.
Finally, the societal savings calculated in the present study may be conservative because
we did not account for workplace productivity, depression-related symptoms, cardiovascu-
lar health, home modification costs, and nursing home costs. Workers having advanced pain
due to osteoarthritis report lower productivity at work compared with those with more lim-
ited symptoms (daCosta DiBonaventura et al., 2012; daCosta DiBonaventura et al., 2011).
A study of Medicare data documented reduced mortality and fewer cardiovascular events
for patients with end-stage osteoarthritis of the knee who undergo total knee arthroplasty
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compared with those who do not (Lovald et al., 2013).
We estimated total lifetime societal savings of approximately $12 billion (net present
value in 2009 dollars) from the more than 600,000 total knee arthroplasties performed in the
U.S. in 2009. These benefits will accrue primarily to the patients in the form of additional
working years and increased income while in the workforce. These findings demonstrate
the importance of using a societal perspective for evaluating the costs and benefits of knee
replacement surgery. With the expected continued growth of total knee arthroplasty, there
will be increased pressure on payers to reduce the use of this procedure by imposing cover-
age restrictions or higher copayments. Our study demonstrates the potential for substantial




State Utility Direct Cost ($)
End-stage Osteoarthritis of the Knee 0.69 $5,282a
Current primary TKA and rehabilitation 0.78 $24,793b
Full benefit after primary or revision TKA 0.835 $4,770a
Limited benefit after primary or revision TKA 0.76 $5,282a
Current revision TKA and rehabilitation 0.781 $30,199b
Failed primary TKA 0.5175 $7,923a
Failed revision TKA 0.5175 $7,923a
Death 0 $0
* Estimates were adjusted to reflect different reimbursement rates across payers (e.g., pri-
vate, Medicare, Medicaid). Estimates include costs from the index hospitalization to three
months after discharge from the index hospitalization. All costs are expressed in 2009
dollars. TKA = total knee arthroplasty.
a Assumption from Losina et al. (2009) after converting from 2006 to 2009 dollars and
adjusting for all-payer reimbursement levels.
b Assumption derived from the authors’ analysis of the Medicare 2009 5% Standard Ana-
lytic Inpatient file.
c The utility value of 0.781 used for the primary and revision TKA health states was derived
by averaging the utility before treatment and the weighted mean of the full and limited-
benefit utilities after treatment.
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Table 3.2




Failure within first year 0.0105
Failure within first year and undergoing revisions 0.1
Surgical mortality 0.0063*Natural Mortality
Failure after first year 0.0134
Failure after first year and undergoing revision 0.5
a Source: Losina et al. (2009). Natural mortality was obtained from U.S. Census data.
Table 3.3
Summary of Benefits from Surgical Treatment According to Age∗
Age Group Direct Cost Offsets Total Societal Savings Net Societal Savings Difference in QALY
40-44 Years $19,232 $177,342 $158,110 3.4
45-49 Years $19,428 $149,930 $130,503 3.2
50-54 Years $19,637 $119,521 $99,884 3.1
55-59 Years $19,871 $85,263 $65,391 2.9
60-64 Years $20,167 $50,531 $30,364 2.6
65-69 Years $20,523 $22,398 $1,875 2.4
70-79 Years $21,193 $6,520 -$14,672 2.1
80+ Years $22,339 $2,978 -$19,362 1.8
All $20,635 $39,565 $18,930 2.4
* Authors’ calculations. Age-weighted mean based on the distribution of total knee arthroplasties performed in the U.S. in 2009.
Table 3.4
Direct Medical Costs and QALYs According to Age and Treatment∗
Total Direct Costs QALYs
Age Group Surgery Non-Surgery Difference in total Direct Medical Costs Surgery Non-Surgery Difference in QALYs
40-44 Years $142,437 $123,205 $19,232 18.8 15.4 3.4
45-49 Years $134,684 $115,256 $19,428 17.6 14.4 3.2
50-54 Years $126,346 $106,710 $19,637 16.3 13.2 3.1
55-59 Years $117,032 $97,161 $19,871 14.9 12 2.9
60-64 Years $107,069 $86,902 $20,167 13.3 10.7 2.6
65-69 Years $96,232 $75,709 $20,523 11.6 9.2 2.4
70-79 Years $80,071 $58,878 $21,193 9.1 7 2.1




Sensitivity Analysis of Selected Model Parameters∗
Parameter Base Model Value Value Range Range of Net Societal Savings* Range of Change in QALY*
Utility in Limited-Benefit State 0.76 0.57-0.95 na 2.30-2.52
Utility in Full-Benefit State 0.835 0.626-0.1 na 1.50-3.21
Rate of Transition to Limited-Benefit 0.12 0.09-0.20 $21,015 - $13,371 2.42-2.40
Rate of Medical Complication 0.028 0.003-0.052 $19,405 - $18,455 N/A
Rate of Death from Surgery 0.0063 x Natural Mortality 0.0047-0.0079 $18,886 - $18,960 2.41-2.31
Cost of End-stage OA $5,282 $3,962 - $6,603 $8,935 - $28,899 na
Cost of primary TKA $24,247 $18,185 - $30,309 $13,064 - $24,796 na
Cost of revision TKA $29,653 $22,240 - $37,066 $19,955 - $17,905 na
Cost of perioperative complications $17,514 $13,135 - $21,893 $19,081 - $18,779 na
SSI payments for full-benefit state Varies by age 25% intervals (50% decrease) $17,109-$20,751 ($15,288) na
Income for full-benefit state Varies by age 25% intervals (50% decrease) $9,762 - $28,098 ($594) na
Missed workdays for full-benefit state Varies by age 25% intervals (50% decrease) $18,883 - $18,997 ($18,836) na
SSI payments for limited-benefit state Varies by age 25% intervals (50% decrease) $18,840 - $18,19,020 ($19,110) na
Income for limited-benefit state Varies by age 25% intervals (50% decrease) $19,734 - $18,126 ($20,539) na
Missed workdays for limited-benefit state Varies by age 25% intervals (50% decrease) $18,937 - $18,923 ($18,945) na
* Authors’ calculation. na = not applicable. Age-weighted mean based on the distribution of total knee arthroplasties performed in the U.S. in 2009.
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Notes: Death is an absorbing state and not included in this representation. OA =
osteoarthritis; TKA= total knee arthroplasty.
Figure 3.1
Representation of Markov Model For End-Stage Knee OA
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Notes: Sensitivity analysis of total societal savings (net savings in direct and indirect costs)
from total knee arthroplasty. The base value of societal savings was $18,930.
OA=osteoarthritis, and TKA = total knee arthroplasty.
Figure 3.2
Sensitivity Analysis of Total Cost Savings For End-Stage Knee OA
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Chapter A: Appendix A
Table A.1
Log of Patient Volume In Aggregate and By Specialty Market With MSAxTIME
(2000 - 2009)
Model 2.3 Model 2.4 Model 2.5 Model 2.6
ln(All) ln(All) ln(All) ln(EYE) ln(NMK) ln(GS) ln(OTHER)
# of ASC -0.0206 -0.0137
(-1.42) (-1.15)
EYE ASC -0.0591 -0.263∗ -0.0873 0.0199 -0.102∗∗
(-1.52) (-2.39) (-1.16) (0.30) (-2.68)
NMK ASC -0.0207 -0.0290 -0.0980+ 0.0484 -0.0550
(-0.74) (-0.34) (-1.88) (1.04) (-1.46)
GS ASC -0.000563 -0.0207 0.0920∗ -0.0752 0.0193
(-0.02) (-0.29) (2.51) (-1.47) (0.76)
MS ASC -0.0211 0.00543 -0.0466 0.0282 -0.000831
(-1.19) (0.07) (-1.60) (1.24) (-0.02)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HOPD FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HSA Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6200 6200 6200 6200
(1) + signifies p<0.1 ; * signifies p<0.05; ** signifies p<0.01; *** signifies p<0.001. T-statistics presented in parentheses.
(2) Standard errors for Models 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5 are robust and clustered at HSA. Model 2.6 estimated as seemingly unrelated
regression equations such that errors are allowed to correlate across equations; standard errors are also robust and clustered
at HSA.
(3) HSA controls include market-specific HHI, number of hospitals, proportion of uninsured population, proportion of pop-
ulation in poverty, total population in 100k, total population in 100k squared; hospital-specific controls include small and
medium bed size indicators. Partial F-tests indicate predictive power of ASC variables, including their interactions, ASC
variables, including their interactions, market controls, time and hospital fixed effects, and hospital controls.
94
Table A.2
Log of Patient Volume In Aggregate and By Specialty Market And Ownership Status
with MSAxTIME (2000 - 2009)
Model 2.4 Model 2.5 Model 2.6
ln(All) ln(All) ln(EYE) ln(NMK) ln(GS) ln(OTHER)
# of ASC -0.0295+
(-1.83)
NP × # of ASC 0.0237
(1.47)
EYE ASC -0.0965 -0.497∗∗ -0.109 -0.0617 -0.0388
(-1.46) (-2.99) (-1.21) (-0.64) (-0.63)
NMK ASC 0.0204 -0.0581 -0.0830 0.184∗∗ -0.0942
(0.39) (-0.51) (-1.34) (3.19) (-1.54)
GS ASC -0.0337 -0.102 0.0534 -0.0779 -0.00758
(-0.88) (-0.98) (1.16) (-1.02) (-0.19)
MS ASC -0.0215 -0.0340 -0.0400 0.0170 -0.0948∗
(-0.65) (-0.26) (-1.04) (0.49) (-1.99)
NFP × EYE ASC 0.0360 0.385+ 0.0346 0.135 -0.0814
(0.56) (1.88) (0.43) (1.51) (-0.95)
NFP × NMK ASC -0.0448 0.0240 -0.0285 -0.210∗ ∗ ∗ 0.0619
(-0.79) (0.17) (-0.34) (-3.52) (0.72)
NFP × GS ASC 0.0545 0.111 0.0597 0.00971 0.0357
(1.36) (0.90) (1.20) (0.16) (0.61)
NFP ×MS ASC 0.0628+ 0.0875 -0.00743 0.0167 0.157∗
(1.72) (0.54) (-0.14) (0.42) (2.22)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HOPD FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HSA Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6200 6200 6200
(1) + signifies p<0.1 ; * signifies p<0.05; ** signifies p<0.01; *** signifies p<0.001. T-statistics presented in
parentheses.
(2) Standard errors for Models 2.4 and 2.5 are robust and clustered at HSA. Model 2.6 estimated as seemingly
unrelated regression equations such that errors are allowed to correlate across equations; standard errors are also
robust and clustered at HSA.
(3) HSA controls include market-specific HHI, number of hospitals, proportion of uninsured population, proportion
of population in poverty, total population in 100k, total population in 100k squared; hospital-specific controls
include small and medium bed size indicators. Partial F-tests indicate predictive power of ASC variables, including




Charlson Comorbidity Index with MSAxTIME (2000 - 2009)
Model 2.8 Model 2.9
(1) (2)
All Volume EYE NMK GS OTHER
EYE ASC 0.00875 0.0260 0.0154 0.0146 -0.0159
(0.35) (0.94) (1.28) (0.98) (-0.53)
NM ASC 0.00178 -0.0122 -0.00521 -0.0182 0.0281
(0.14) (-0.47) (-0.57) (-1.88) (1.81)
GS ASC 0.00179 -0.0367∗ -0.0133∗ 0.0193∗ -0.00175
(0.13) (-2.49) (-2.14) (2.04) (-0.09)
MS ASC 0.00232 0.0128 0.0106 -0.00247 0.0202
(0.23) (0.88) (1.39) (-0.33) (1.65)
NP × EYE ASC -0.0277 -0.0345 -0.0422∗∗ -0.0322∗ -0.000906
(-1.15) (-1.12) (-3.04) (-1.99) (-0.03)
NP × NM ASC 0.00882 0.0157 0.0136 0.0241∗ -0.0234
(0.51) (0.59) (1.32) (2.18) (-1.16)
NP × GS ASC 0.00205 0.00903 0.00803 -0.00436 0.00434
(0.14) (0.53) (1.11) (-0.45) (0.22)
NP ×MS ASC -0.00744 -0.0148 -0.0138 -0.00385 -0.0357∗∗
(-0.63) (-0.96) (-1.23) (-0.35) (-2.87)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HOPD FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HSA Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6200 6200
(1) + signifies p<0.1 ; * signifies p<0.05; ** signifies p<0.01; *** signifies p<0.001. T-
statistics presented in parentheses.
(2) Model 2.8 standard errors are robust and clustered at HSA. Model 2.9 estimated as seem-
ingly unrelated regression equations such that errors are allowed to correlate across equations;
standard errors are also robust and clustered at HSA.
(3) HSA controls include market-specific HHI, number of hospitals, proportion of uninsured
population, proportion of population in poverty, total population in 100k, total population in
100k squared; hospital-specific controls include small and medium bed size indicators. Partial
F-tests indicate predictive power of ASC variables, including their interactions, ASC variables,




Log Volume of Government Insured Patients with MSAxTIME (2000 - 2009)
Model 2.8 Model 2.9
ln(Vol) ln(EYE) ln(NMK) ln(GS) ln(OTHER)
EYE ASC -0.0207 -0.550∗∗ -0.0130 0.00593 0.0555
(-0.16) (-2.79) (-0.09) (0.04) (0.46)
NMK ASC -0.0222 -0.0626 -0.115 0.124+ -0.126
(-0.31) (-0.51) (-1.50) (1.69) (-1.52)
GS ASC -0.0575 -0.0536 0.0366 -0.0550 -0.0457
(-1.48) (-0.48) (0.70) (-0.61) (-1.02)
MS ASC -0.0287 -0.0336 -0.0313 -0.00746 -0.106
(-0.67) (-0.24) (-0.69) (-0.18) (-1.59)
NFP × EYE ASC -0.0894 0.377 -0.107 0.0510 -0.217
(-0.71) (1.50) (-0.74) (0.33) (-1.49)
NFP × NMK ASC -0.00196 0.0625 -0.0218 -0.154∗ 0.0774
(-0.03) (0.39) (-0.23) (-2.03) (0.75)
NFP × GS ASC 0.0983∗ 0.0739 0.100+ 0.000622 0.0959
(2.48) (0.55) (1.80) (0.01) (1.49)
NFP ×MS ASC 0.0847∗ 0.0573 0.0249 0.0528 0.170∗
(1.99) (0.33) (0.35) (1.13) (2.08)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HOPD FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HSA Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6200 6200
(1) + signifies p<0.1 ; * signifies p<0.05; ** signifies p<0.01; *** signifies p<0.001. T-statistics
presented in parentheses.
(2) Model 2.8 standard errors are robust and clustered at HSA. Model 2.9 estimated as seemingly
unrelated regression equations such that errors are allowed to correlate across equations; standard
errors are also robust and clustered at HSA.
(3) HSA controls include market-specific HHI, number of hospitals, proportion of uninsured popula-
tion, proportion of population in poverty, total population in 100k, total population in 100k squared;
hospital-specific controls include small and medium bed size indicators. Partial F-tests indicate pre-
dictive power of ASC variables, including their interactions, ASC variables, including their interac-
tions, market controls, time and hospital fixed effects, and hospital controls.
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Table A.5
Log Volume of Privately Insured Patients with MSAxTIME (2000 - 2009)
Model 2.8 Model 2.9
ln(Vol All) ln(EYE) ln(NMK) ln(GS) ln(OTHER)
EYE ASC -0.142∗ -0.347∗∗ -0.139 -0.0952 -0.107∗
(-2.18) (-2.59) (-1.37) (-1.01) (-2.16)
NMK ASC 0.0902 -0.0714 -0.0338 0.233∗ ∗ ∗ -0.0185
(1.50) (-0.84) (-0.52) (3.43) (-0.31)
GS ASC -0.0168 -0.0398 0.0593 -0.0769 0.0183
(-0.37) (-0.47) (1.13) (-0.95) (0.42)
MS ASC -0.0483 -0.0277 -0.0739+ -0.0340 -0.132∗
(-0.99) (-0.28) (-1.81) (-0.69) (-2.33)
NFP × EYE ASC 0.109 0.431∗∗ 0.0808 0.173+ 0.0241
(1.64) (3.07) (0.99) (1.67) (0.34)
NFP × NMK ASC -0.134∗ -0.0212 -0.0620 -0.284∗ ∗ ∗ -0.0243
(-2.12) (-0.19) (-0.79) (-4.11) (-0.30)
NFP × GS ASC 0.0329 0.0380 0.0543 -0.000521 -0.00472
(0.75) (0.36) (1.09) (-0.01) (-0.08)
NFP ×MS ASC 0.102 0.0865 0.0126 0.0650 0.204∗
(1.62) (0.67) (0.29) (1.21) (2.49)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HOPD FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HSA Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6200 6200
(1) + signifies p<0.1 ; * signifies p<0.05; ** signifies p<0.01; *** signifies p<0.001. T-statistics
presented in parentheses.
(2) Model 2.8 standard errors are robust and clustered at HSA. Model 2.9 estimated as seemingly
unrelated regression equations such that errors are allowed to correlate across equations; standard
errors are also robust and clustered at HSA.
(3) HSA controls include market-specific HHI, number of hospitals, proportion of uninsured popula-
tion, proportion of population in poverty, total population in 100k, total population in 100k squared;
hospital-specific controls include small and medium bed size indicators. Partial F-tests indicate predic-
tive power of ASC variables, including their interactions, ASC variables, including their interactions,
market controls, time and hospital fixed effects, and hospital controls.
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Table A.6
Log Volume of Uninsured Patients with MSAxTIME (2000 - 2009)
Model 2.8 Model 2.9
ln(All Vol) ln(EYE) ln(NMK) ln(GS) ln(OTHER)
EYE ASC 0.0371 -0.0838 0.0458 -0.0626 0.139
(0.32) (-1.02) (0.34) (-0.52) (1.00)
NMK ASC -0.112 -0.101 -0.0813 0.202∗∗ -0.230∗
(-1.24) (-1.62) (-1.03) (3.00) (-1.99)
GS ASC -0.0435 -0.0756 -0.0145 0.0179 -0.0537
(-0.50) (-1.54) (-0.17) (0.21) (-0.55)
MS ASC -0.0999 -0.131∗∗ 0.00815 0.0531 -0.219∗
(-1.43) (-2.91) (0.24) (1.01) (-2.24)
NFP × EYE ASC -0.0892 0.0217 -0.0935 0.0859 -0.182
(-0.54) (0.21) (-0.54) (0.61) (-0.95)
NFP × NMK ASC 0.142 0.131+ 0.0900 -0.118 0.212
(1.14) (1.66) (0.97) (-1.43) (1.20)
NFP × GS ASC 0.0509 0.0513 0.0892 -0.0143 0.0549
(0.42) (0.84) (0.76) (-0.15) (0.40)
NFP ×MS ASC 0.0832 0.0226 -0.0948+ -0.0660 0.197
(0.78) (0.35) (-1.89) (-1.20) (1.31)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HOPD FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HSA Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6200 6200
(1) + signifies p<0.1 ; * signifies p<0.05; ** signifies p<0.01; *** signifies p<0.001. T-statistics
presented in parentheses.
(2) Model 2.8 standard errors are robust and clustered at HSA. Model 2.9 estimated as seemingly
unrelated regression equations such that errors are allowed to correlate across equations; standard
errors are also robust and clustered at HSA.
(3) HSA controls include market-specific HHI, number of hospitals, proportion of uninsured pop-
ulation, proportion of population in poverty, total population in 100k, total population in 100k
squared; hospital-specific controls include small and medium bed size indicators. Partial F-tests
indicate predictive power of ASC variables, including their interactions, ASC variables, including
their interactions, market controls, time and hospital fixed effects, and hospital controls.
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Table A.7
Log Volume of Unique Physician Count with MSAxTIME (2000 - 2009)
Model 2.8 Model 2.9
ln(All) ln(EYE) ln(NMK) ln(GS) ln(OTHER)
EYE ASC -0.0526 -0.143∗ -0.0195 -0.000649 -0.0629
(-1.56) (-2.37) (-0.52) (-0.02) (-1.62)
NMK ASC 0.0453 -0.0271 -0.0156 0.00820 0.0243
(1.09) (-0.69) (-0.53) (0.26) (0.60)
GS ASC -0.0234 -0.0223 -0.0148 0.0146 -0.0142
(-0.95) (-0.59) (-0.71) (0.51) (-0.60)
MS ASC -0.0485+ -0.0630 -0.0342 -0.0323 -0.0798∗∗
(-1.85) (-1.44) (-1.59) (-1.64) (-2.81)
NFP × EYE ASC -0.0171 0.140∗ -0.0601 0.0123 -0.0146
(-0.32) (2.25) (-1.43) (0.25) (-0.25)
NFP × NMK ASC -0.00703 0.00224 0.0344 0.00158 -0.00102
(-0.14) (0.04) (0.76) (0.04) (-0.02)
NFP × GS ASC 0.0264 0.0420 0.0480+ -0.0143 0.0284
(0.90) (1.00) (1.74) (-0.45) (0.78)
NFP ×MS ASC 0.0726∗ 0.109∗ 0.0169 -0.00150 0.102∗
(2.15) (2.04) (0.52) (-0.05) (2.43)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HOPD FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HSA Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6200 6200
(1) + signifies p<0.1 ; * signifies p<0.05; ** signifies p<0.01; *** signifies p<0.001. T-statistics
presented in parentheses.
(2) Model 2.8 standard errors are robust and clustered at HSA. Model 2.9 estimated as seemingly
unrelated regression equations such that errors are allowed to correlate across equations; standard
errors are also robust and clustered at HSA.
(3) HSA controls include market-specific HHI, number of hospitals, proportion of uninsured popula-
tion, proportion of population in poverty, total population in 100k, total population in 100k squared;
hospital-specific controls include small and medium bed size indicators. Partial F-tests indicate pre-
dictive power of ASC variables, including their interactions, market controls, time and hospital fixed
effects, and hospital controls.
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Table A.8
Log of Patient Volume In Aggregate and By Specialty Market And Ownership Status
with NFP Status x TIME (2000 - 2009)
Model 2.9
ln(EYE) ln(NMK) ln(GS) ln(OTHER)
EYE ASC -0.358∗ -0.0880 -0.0663 -0.0492
(-2.24) (-1.09) (-0.69) (-0.81)
NMK ASC 0.0216 -0.0251 0.168∗ -0.0661
(0.16) (-0.41) (2.17) (-1.08)
GS ASC -0.159 0.0521 -0.0608 -0.0395
(-1.31) (1.09) (-0.61) (-0.96)
MS ASC -0.0190 -0.0235 0.00468 -0.105∗
(-0.16) (-0.71) (0.10) (-2.14)
NFP × EYE ASC 0.381+ 0.121 0.203∗ -0.00300
(1.77) (1.24) (2.06) (-0.03)
NFP × NMK ASC -0.0515 -0.0711 -0.262∗ ∗ ∗ 0.0289
(-0.33) (-0.83) (-3.67) (0.35)
NFP × GS ASC 0.0746 -0.000782 0.0435 0.0335
(0.48) (-0.01) (0.68) (0.62)
NFP ×MS ASC 0.0518 0.0332 0.0441 0.189∗∗
(0.33) (0.59) (0.95) (2.81)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
HOPD FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
HSA Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6200
(1) + signifies p<0.1 ; * signifies p<0.05; ** signifies p<0.01; *** signifies p<0.001.
T-statistics presented in parentheses.
(2) Model 2.9 estimated as seemingly unrelated regression equations such that errors
are allowed to correlate across equations; standard errors are also robust and clustered
at HSA.
(3) HSA controls include market-specific HHI, number of hospitals, proportion
of uninsured population, proportion of population in poverty, total population in
100k, total population in 100k squared; hospital-specific controls include small and
medium bed size indicators. Partial F-tests indicate predictive power of ASC vari-




Charlson Comorbidity Index with NFP Status X TIME (2000 - 2009)
Model 2.9
(1)
EYE NMK GS OTHER
EYE ASC 0.0283 0.00783 0.00776 -0.00751
(0.97) (0.75) (0.51) (-0.26)
NMK ASC -0.00953 -0.00604 -0.0134 0.0101
(-0.36) (-0.73) (-1.32) (0.66)
GS ASC -0.0280 -0.0152∗ 0.00469 -0.0141
(-1.79) (-2.27) (0.40) (-0.89)
MS ASC 0.0251 0.00801 -0.00577 0.0109
(1.59) (1.44) (-0.93) (0.89)
NFP × EYE ASC -0.0398 -0.0444∗∗ -0.0350∗ 0.00171
(-1.23) (-2.91) (-2.01) (0.06)
NFP × NMK ASC 0.0101 0.0180 0.0307∗ -0.00682
(0.35) (1.62) (2.57) (-0.32)
NFP × GS ASC 0.000166 0.0111 -0.00212 0.0103
(0.01) (1.23) (-0.19) (0.42)
NFP ×MS ASC -0.0232 -0.0155 -0.00491 -0.0239∗
(-1.31) (-1.30) (-0.44) (-1.96)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
HOPD FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
HSA Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6200
(1) + signifies p<0.1 ; * signifies p<0.05; ** signifies p<0.01; *** signifies
p<0.001. T-statistics presented in parentheses.
(2) Model 2.9 estimated as seemingly unrelated regression equations such that er-
rors are allowed to correlate across equations; standard errors are also robust and
clustered at HSA.
(3) HSA controls include market-specific HHI, number of hospitals, proportion
of uninsured population, proportion of population in poverty, total population in
100k, total population in 100k squared; hospital-specific controls include small
and medium bed size indicators. Partial F-tests indicate predictive power of ASC
variables, including their interactions, market controls, time and hospital fixed
effects, and hospital controls.
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Table A.10
Log Volume of Government Insured Patients with NFP Status x TIME (2000 - 2009)
Model 2.9
ln(EYE) ln(NMK) ln(GS) ln(OTHER)
EYE ASC -0.363+ -0.00226 -0.0195 0.0415
(-1.91) (-0.02) (-0.13) (0.40)
NMK ASC 0.00411 -0.0657 0.0923 -0.110
(0.03) (-0.87) (1.02) (-1.43)
GS ASC -0.149 0.0171 -0.0514 -0.0961+
(-1.09) (0.28) (-0.45) (-1.78)
MS ASC -0.0230 -0.0200 -0.0225 -0.121+
(-0.18) (-0.47) (-0.39) (-1.86)
NFP × EYE ASC 0.362 0.0177 0.153 -0.123
(1.48) (0.13) (1.02) (-0.90)
NFP × NMK ASC -0.0203 -0.0533 -0.186+ 0.0547
(-0.11) (-0.52) (-1.85) (0.54)
NFP × GS ASC 0.0398 0.0606 0.0437 0.110+
(0.24) (0.88) (0.53) (1.69)
NFP ×MS ASC 0.0309 0.0797 0.0980+ 0.216∗∗
(0.19) (1.17) (1.83) (2.76)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
HOPD FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
HSA Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6200
(1) + signifies p<0.1 ; * signifies p<0.05; ** signifies p<0.01; *** signifies
p<0.001. T-statistics presented in parentheses.
(2) Model 2.9 estimated as seemingly unrelated regression equations such that er-
rors are allowed to correlate across equations; standard errors are also robust and
clustered at HSA.
(3) HSA controls include market-specific HHI, number of hospitals, proportion
of uninsured population, proportion of population in poverty, total population in
100k, total population in 100k squared; hospital-specific controls include small and
medium bed size indicators. Partial F-tests indicate predictive power of ASC vari-




Log Volume of Privately Insured Patients with NFP Status x TIME (2000 - 2009)
Model 2.9
ln(EYE) ln(NMK) ln(GS) ln(OTHER)
EYE ASC -0.318∗∗ -0.125 -0.105 -0.136∗∗
(-2.67) (-1.48) (-1.15) (-2.77)
NMK ASC 0.0237 0.0395 0.245∗∗ 0.0350
(0.28) (0.54) (2.89) (0.56)
GS ASC -0.108 0.0754 -0.0480 0.0142
(-1.21) (1.39) (-0.48) (0.34)
MS ASC -0.0235 -0.0525 -0.0338 -0.141∗
(-0.26) (-1.27) (-0.55) (-2.54)
NFP × EYE ASC 0.440∗∗ 0.139 0.192+ 0.0756
(3.12) (1.39) (1.82) (0.89)
NFP × NMK ASC -0.104 -0.131 -0.367∗ ∗ ∗ -0.0951
(-0.93) (-1.48) (-4.63) (-1.07)
NFP × GS ASC 0.0598 -0.0302 0.0306 -0.0304
(0.51) (-0.42) (0.42) (-0.60)
NFP ×MS ASC 0.0669 0.0426 0.0769 0.227∗∗
(0.59) (0.76) (1.39) (3.00)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
HOPD FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
HSA Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6200
(1) + signifies p<0.1 ; * signifies p<0.05; ** signifies p<0.01; *** signifies
p<0.001. T-statistics presented in parentheses.
(2) Model 2.9 estimated as seemingly unrelated regression equations such that er-
rors are allowed to correlate across equations; standard errors are also robust and
clustered at HSA.
(3) HSA controls include market-specific HHI, number of hospitals, proportion
of uninsured population, proportion of population in poverty, total population in
100k, total population in 100k squared; hospital-specific controls include small and
medium bed size indicators. Partial F-tests indicate predictive power of ASC vari-




Log Volume of Uninsured Patients with NFP Status x TIME (2000 - 2009)
Model 2.9
ln(EYE) ln(NMK) ln(GS) ln(OTHER)
EYE ASC -0.00784 0.00895 -0.0192 0.173
(-0.11) (0.06) (-0.15) (1.32)
NMK ASC -0.116∗ -0.0160 0.173∗ -0.199+
(-2.13) (-0.22) (2.54) (-1.80)
GS ASC -0.0557 -0.0280 -0.0245 -0.0918
(-1.21) (-0.29) (-0.22) (-1.05)
MS ASC -0.132∗∗ -0.0230 -0.0207 -0.220∗
(-2.88) (-0.69) (-0.38) (-2.09)
NFP × EYE ASC 0.0169 0.0104 0.177 -0.0820
(0.20) (0.07) (1.26) (-0.44)
NFP × NMK ASC 0.122 0.0463 -0.131 0.207
(1.50) (0.52) (-1.52) (1.22)
NFP × GS ASC 0.00407 0.0488 0.00523 0.0597
(0.08) (0.47) (0.05) (0.54)
NFP ×MS ASC 0.0127 -0.0514 -0.0215 0.221
(0.20) (-0.96) (-0.36) (1.50)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
HOPD FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
HSA Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6200
(1) + signifies p<0.1 ; * signifies p<0.05; ** signifies p<0.01; *** signifies
p<0.001. T-statistics presented in parentheses.
(2) Model 2.9 estimated as seemingly unrelated regression equations such that er-
rors are allowed to correlate across equations; standard errors are also robust and
clustered at HSA.
(3) HSA controls include market-specific HHI, number of hospitals, proportion
of uninsured population, proportion of population in poverty, total population in
100k, total population in 100k squared; hospital-specific controls include small and
medium bed size indicators. Partial F-tests indicate predictive power of ASC vari-




Log Volume of Unique Physician Count with NFP Status x TIME (2000 - 2009)
Model 2.9
EYE NMK GS OTHER
EYE ASC -0.131∗ -0.0250 -0.0322 -0.0896∗
(-2.40) (-0.85) (-0.78) (-2.24)
NMK ASC -0.00220 0.0123 0.0219 0.0208
(-0.05) (0.37) (0.59) (0.57)
GS ASC -0.0363 -0.0253 0.00996 -0.0260
(-0.85) (-1.28) (0.29) (-1.05)
MS ASC -0.0782+ -0.0309 -0.0426 -0.0922∗∗
(-1.93) (-1.18) (-1.59) (-3.25)
NFP × EYE ASC 0.172∗∗ -0.0142 0.0706 0.0726
(2.66) (-0.29) (1.41) (1.04)
NFP × NMK ASC 0.00554 0.0153 -0.00963 -0.0176
(0.10) (0.32) (-0.21) (-0.31)
NFP × GS ASC 0.0393 0.0233 -0.0218 0.0177
(0.79) (0.66) (-0.66) (0.49)
NFP ×MS ASC 0.118∗ 0.0428 0.0327 0.151∗ ∗ ∗
(2.21) (1.33) (1.14) (3.86)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
HOPD FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
HSA Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6200
(1) + signifies p<0.1 ; * signifies p<0.05; ** signifies p<0.01; *** signifies
p<0.001. T-statistics presented in parentheses.
(2) Model 2.9 estimated as seemingly unrelated regression equations such that
errors are allowed to correlate across equations; standard errors are also robust
and clustered at HSA.
(3) HSA controls include market-specific HHI, number of hospitals, proportion
of uninsured population, proportion of population in poverty, total population in
100k, total population in 100k squared; hospital-specific controls include small
and medium bed size indicators. Partial F-tests indicate predictive power of
ASC variables, including their interactions, market controls, time and hospital
fixed effects, and hospital controls.
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Chapter B: Appendix B
This technical appendix describes our approach to estimating the indirect costs asso-
ciated with end-stage osteoarthritis of the knee and the effects of total knee arthroplasty
(TKA) on these costs. In addition, we present our approach to convert Medicare to all-
payer reimbursement levels.
B.1 Framework for Estimating Indirect Costs
We used data from the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) to generate regression
coefficients that described the statistical relationship between physical functional status and
economic outcomes. We applied regression coefficients to surgical outcomes data obtained
from a survey of patients treated at a multi-practice orthopaedic surgeon group to estimate
the effect of surgery on income, missed work days, and the probability of receiving dis-
ability payments (Supplemental Security Income (SSI)). These findings were incorporated
into a Markov decision model to estimate total societal savings resulting from total knee
replacement. The NHIS, which is used to monitor the health of the U.S. population, is one
of the major data collection programs of the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS)
which is part of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The NHIS covers
the civilian noninstitutionalized population residing in the United States with an expected
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NHIS sample size (completed interviews) of approximately 35,000 households each year.
B.2 Estimating the relationship between functional limitations and indirect costs
The NHIS collects information from a stratified random sample of the U.S. population
on physical function, economic factors such as employment status and income, and other
patient characteristics. Our analysis combined the 2003 through 2010 NHIS files to in-
crease the sample size, resulting in a sample of 202,525 adults age 18 and older living in
non-institutional settings. The NHIS asks respondents: By yourself, and without using any
special equipment, how difficult is it for you to...
• Walk a quarter of a mile - about 3 city blocks?
• Walk up 10 steps without resting?
• Sit for about 2 hours?
• Reach up over your head?
• Stand or be on your feet for about 2 hours?
• Stoop, bend, or kneel?
• Lift or carry something as heavy as 10 pounds such as a full bag of groceries?
• Push or pull large objects like a living room chair?
Responses to each question include: (1) Not at all difficult, (2) Only a little difficult,
(3) Somewhat difficult, (4) Very difficult, (5) Can’t do at all. Our analysis focuses only
on activity limitations where the respondent indicates that back pain, bone/joint injury,
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or arthritis contributed to his/her limitations. Using regression analysis we compare the
probability of being employed, household income, missed worked days, and probability
of receiving disability payments for adults with activity limitations to economic outcomes
for adults without activity limitations. Responses to physical functioning questions were
decoupled such that for each question and each response (e.g., only a little difficult, some-
what difficult, very difficult, can’t do at all, and not at all difficult), a binary variable (1=yes,
0=no) was created. Persons claiming that the physical functioning task was not at all dif-
ficult were used as the comparison group. We including the following control variables in
each model: age (age groups: 18-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54, 55-59, 60 to 64, 65-69, and 70
years and over), sex, highest educational attainment (high school diploma, baccalaureate
degree, post-baccalaureate degree), and occupation (for analysis of household income and
missed worked days). Logistic regression was used for employment and disability payment
status models. In the employment model, the dependent variable took on a value of 1 if
a survey respondent reported that he or she has a job in the last week. For the disability
payment model, the dependent variable took on a value of 1 if a survey respondent reported
that he or she was currently receiving SSI. Ordinary least squares regression was used to
quantify the impact of activity limitations on household income and missed work days.
These models only included respondents who reported that they were employed in the last
week. Regression results are shown in Table A1 for the functional outcome variables.
B.3 Physician Group TKA Patient Outcome Data
Predicted values for indirect cost components were obtained by utilizing patient-reported
data collected by a physician group practice with multiple locations. Electronic question-
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naires were sent to approximately 310 patients who received a TKA between September
2010 and April 2011. A total of 74 responses were received and used in the analyses. The
survey contained questions concerning an individuals socioeconomic status and functional
ability (using the same questions on functional status as in the NHIS) prior to obtaining
surgery and after receiving surgery. Functional questions included the following possible
answers: No difficulty, Only a little difficult, Somewhat difficult, Very Difficult, and Can-
not do. Numerical values of 1 through 5 were assigned to the responses; with No difficulty
assigned a value of 1 and Cannot do assigned a value of 5. Patients were categorized as re-
ceiving full-benefit from the TKA if their average, post-surgical response for all functional
questions was equal to or less than 3 (somewhat difficult) and limited benefit otherwise.
Assuming this response categorization allowed us to match the Losina et al. (2009) distri-
bution of patients experiencing Full-Benefit, which was 88 percent.
B.4 Methods for Combining Indirect Cost Components and Patient Outcome Data
The relationships between functional status and indirect costs were determined by least
squares and logistic regression models (above). The results from the models allowed us
to determine changes to an individuals probability of being employed, number of missed
work days, household income, and disability payments conditional on their level of func-
tional ability in a given year. Data from the 74 patients who received a TKA between 2009
and 2011 allowed us to determine changes in functional measures for TKA recipients. For
each observation from the patient outcome data, functional responses were held constant
while age was allowed to vary from 40 to 99. This allowed us to obtain predicted values
from our indirect cost model for assumed ages 40 to 99 for the probability of being em-
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ployed, probability of being disabled, income (in dollars), and missed work days for pre-
and post-surgical periods. Persons older than 75 years were assumed to be employed with
a probability of 0. Thus, there were 59 observations, varied only by age, for each obser-
vation of in the patient survey, resulting in a total of 59 x 74 observations. The predicted
probabilities for employment, disability, predicted income and missed work days were then
averaged at each age. Once the average employment probability by age was obtained, we
computed expected income changes from having a TKA as:
Expected Income = (Estimated Income Post Surgery * Probability of Being Em-
ployed Post Surgery) (Estimated Income Pre Surgery * Probability of Being Em-
ployed Pre Surgery).
Our change in the value of missed worked days from receiving a TKA was computed
as:
Expected Value of Missed Work Days = (Estimated Income Post Surgery * Prob-
ability of Being Employed Post Surgery*(Missed Work Days Post Surgery/240)) (Es-
timated Income Pre Surgery * Probability of Being Employed Pre Surgery*(Missed
Work Days Pre Surgery/240)).
Additionally, we assumed that workers lost an average of 40 days as a result of the
TKA surgery. To account for income lost during this period, average predicted incomes by
age were multiplied by an individuals probability of being employed. Changes in expected
disability payments were computed by multiplying the change in probability of being dis-
abled due to TKA receipt by SSI payments, by gender and age. Our change in disability
payments from receiving a TKA was computed as
Expected Disability Payments = (Estimated disability payment * Probability of Be-
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ing on Disability Post Surgery) (Estimated disability payment * Probability of Being
on Disability Pre Surgery).
Disability payments were determined as a function of age and gender, as shown in the
table below, and were taken from the 2011 Current Population Survey.
B.5 Converting Medicare costs to all-payer costs
Cost estimates based on Medicare payment rates may underestimate payments made
by private insurers and overestimate payments made by Medicaid, self-insured, and unin-
sured patients. To reconcile these differences, we adjusted our estimates of direct medical
costs using payment rates of other insurers (as a percentage of the Medicare rate) and then
weighted by the national distribution of payers for TKA. We set the payment rates of Med-
icaid and self-pay patients as 80 percent and 50 percent of the Medicare rate, respectively.
For private insurers, we used the payment rates reported in the literature. Ginsburg (2010)
estimated that private insurers, on average, paid 139 percent of the Medicare payment rates
for inpatient care nationally in 2008. The same study also reported private insurer pay-
ments as a percentage of Medicare rates for outpatient services in selected areas, ranging
from 193 percent in Cleveland to 368 percent in San Francisco. We used the median of
the reported range, which is 280 percent, to adjust costs of outpatient services. The Medi-
care Payment Advisory Committee (MedPAC) estimated that the private rate for physician
services was, on average, 123 percent of the Medicare rate across all services and areas in
2003 (MedPAC, 2005). For all other patients, including those paid by workers compen-




Regression Results from National Health Interview Survey
All Adults (Age 18+) Employed Adults (Age 18-74)
Employed Receives SSI Household Income ($) Missed Work Days
Intercept (2.11)* (1.05)* 22,389.00* 1.54*
Male 0.56* (0.09)* 1,724.89* (0.78)*
Age 40-44 vs. <40 0.98* 0.02 6,849.05* 0.44*
Age 45-49 vs. <40 1.00* 0.06 6,586.54* 0.34*
Age 50-54 vs. <40 0.88* 0.06 6,081.18* 0.45*
Age 55-59 vs. <40 0.51* 0.09* 6,982.35* 0.54*
Age 60-64 vs. <40 (0.23)* 0.09* 5,513.12* 0.02
Age 65-69 vs. <40 (1.25)* 0.09* 3,517.98* -0.15
Age 70+ vs. <40 (2.45)* (0.26)* (2,200.42)* (1.67)*
Difficulty walking vs. no difficulty
Only a little difficult 0.10* 0.08 (1,622.05)* 2.51*
Somewhat difficult 0.01 0.04 (3,206.39)* 2.77*
Very difficult (0.11)* -0.05 (3,577.24)* 3.83*
Can’t do at all (0.28)* -0.02 (4,562.09)* 6.63*
Difficulty climbing vs. no difficulty
Only a little difficult 0.07 -0.06 (2,746.64)* 1.27*
Somewhat difficult 0 0 (3,000.66)* 1.03*
Very difficult 0.04 0.17* (2,811.49)* 2.53*
Can’t do at all (0.19)* 0.17* -2,899.45 5.48*
Difficulty sitting vs. no difficulty
Only a little difficult 0.19* (0.15)* 1,137.17 0.21
Somewhat difficult 0.01 -0.04 455.22 2.21*
Very difficult -0.03 0.11* 522.52 0.76
Can’t do at all (0.40)* 0.24* -1,811.47 9.92*
Difficulty reaching vs. no difficulty
Only a little difficult 0.19* 0.04 349.2 0.56
Somewhat difficult -0.01 -0.01 461.73 4.60*
Very difficult (0.20)* 0.09 -802.84 2.97*
Can’t do at all (0.28)* -0.08 2.97*
Difficulty standing vs. no difficulty
Only a little difficult 0.28* -0.07 782.15 0.2
Somewhat difficult 0.06* -0.01 356.92 2.11*
Very difficult (0.21)* 0.14* 980.34 1.60*
Can’t do at all (0.66)* 0.09 -782.01 5.06*
Difficulty stooping vs. no difficulty
Only a little difficult 0.03 0.06 609.53 0.11
Somewhat difficult 0.01 0 -244.53 0.53
Very difficult 0.03 -0.06 -690.16 0.89*
Can’t do at all 0.01 -0.07 456.71 4.70*
Difficulty carrying vs. no difficulty
Only a little difficult 0.04 -0.06 (1,796.57)* -0.62
Somewhat difficult 0.07 -0.01 (2,486.52)* 1.21*
Very difficult (0.29)* 0.19* (4,736.26)* 4.38*
Can’t do at all (0.14)* 0.17* (4,645.73)* 2.52*
Difficulty pushing vs. no difficulty
Only a little difficult 0.08* -0.09 -292.5 1.17*
Somewhat difficult 0.11* -0.01 -861.07 2.81*
Very difficult -0.01 0.13* -441.08 3.36*
Can’t do at all (0.38)* 0.07 1,679.21 14.53*
Has mobility difficulty due to
Back pain 0.09* -0.03 -297.35 1.32*
Joint injury 0.09* 0.01 985 4.70*
Musculoskeletal condition (0.15)* 0.15* -603.61 2.47*
Arthritis 0.15* 0.09 257.24 (1.38)*
Source: Author’ analysis of the NHIS 2003-2010 data.
Notes: (1) Coefficients from Logistic regression.
(2) Coefficients from Ordinary Least Squares regression.
Comparison group is female, under age 40, no activity limitations, year 2010, unemployed
or occupation not available (for regressions that include occupation), and no high school degree.
*Statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Additional control variables included in the model but not shown:
dummy variables for survey year and occupation.
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Table B.2
TKA Patient Responses from Rothman Institute (n=74)
Pre-Surgical Responses Post-Surgical Responses
Questions % in Full-Benefit % in Limited-Benefit % in Full-Benefit % in Limited-Benefit
Walk a quarter of a mile 48% 52% 90% 10%
Walk up 10 steps 64% 36% 92% 8%
Sit for about 2 hours 85% 14% 100% 0%
Reach up over your head 96% 4% 99% 1%
Stand or be on your feet for about 2 hours 49% 51% 81% 19%
Stoop, bend, or kneel 33% 67% 75% 25%
Lift or carry 10 lbs 74% 26% 93% 7%
Push or pull large objects (e.g., chair) 63% 37% 89% 11%












Notes: Amounts in 2009 dollars.
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